Lying takes time : a meta-analysis on reaction time measures of deception by Suchotzki, Kristina et al.
LYING TAKES TIME       1 
 
Accepted for publication in “Psychological Bulletin” 
Note: This is an uncorrected version of an author’s manuscript accepted for publication. 
The proofs for this manuscript will be copyedited and reviewed before final publication. During this 
process, small corrections may be made that could affect the content. 
 
Lying Takes Time: 
A Meta-Analysis on Reaction Time Measures of Deception 
Kristina Suchotzki1,2, Bruno Verschuere3, Bram Van Bockstaele4,5,2, Gershon Ben-Shakhar6, and Geert 
Crombez2 
1Department of Psychology, University of Würzburg, Marcusstraße 9-11, 97070 Würzburg, Germany 
2Department of Experimental-Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 
9000 Ghent, Belgium 
3Department of Clinical Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 
WT Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
4Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 
1018 WT Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
5Department of Child Development and Education, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Prinsengracht 
130, 1018 VZ Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
6Department of Psychology, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, 
Israel 
Corresponding author: Kristina Suchotzki, Department of Psychology, University of Würzburg, 
Marcusstraße 9-11, 97070 Würzburg, Germany  
Tel: + 49 (0)931-31-82861, Email: kristina.suchotzki@uni-wuerzburg.de 
LYING TAKES TIME       2 
 
Abstract 
Lie detection techniques are frequently used, but most of them have been criticized for 
the lack of empirical support for their predictive validity and presumed underlying 
mechanisms. This situation has led to increased efforts to unravel the cognitive mechanisms 
underlying deception and to develop a comprehensive theory of deception. A cognitive 
approach to deception has reinvigorated interest in reaction time (RT) measures to 
differentiate lies from truths and to investigate whether lying is more cognitively demanding 
than truth telling. Here, we provide the results of a meta-analysis of 114 studies (n = 3307) 
using computerized RT paradigms to assess the cognitive cost of lying. Results revealed a 
large standardized RT difference, even after correction for publication bias (d = 1.049; 95% 
CI [0.930; 1.169]), with a large heterogeneity amongst effect sizes. Moderator analyses 
revealed that the RT deception effect was smaller, yet still large, in studies in which 
participants received instructions to avoid detection. The autobiographical Implicit 
Association Test produced smaller effects than the Concealed Information Test, the Sheffield 
Lie Test, and the Differentiation of Deception paradigm. An additional meta-analysis (17 
studies, n = 348) showed that, like other deception measures, RT deception measures are 
susceptible to countermeasures. Whereas our meta-analysis corroborates current cognitive 
approaches to deception, the observed heterogeneity calls for further research on the boundary 
conditions of the cognitive cost of deception. RT-based measures of deception may have 
potential in applied settings, but countermeasures remain an important challenge. 
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Introduction 
In February 2012, Trayvon Martin, a 17-year-old African American high school 
student, was shot. His death sparked a heated debate in the media as well as in criminal court, 
and President Obama declared: ‘Trayvon Martin could have been me 35 years ago’. George 
Zimmerman, the neighborhood watch coordinator of the community, admitted to the shooting 
yet claimed to have acted in self-defense. To determine the veracity of his statement, 
Zimmerman was taken into custody and interrogated. The interrogation included a lie 
detection test. While rarely accepted as evidence in court, lie detection tests are routinely 
applied by the police in North America (http://www.cvsa1.com/agencies.htm; see also 
National Research Council, 2003).  
The key question in the Zimmerman case was whether he acted in self-defense. The lie 
test therefore focused on voice stress parameters to two questions: “Did you confront the guy 
you shot?” and “Were you in fear for your life when you shot the guy?”. The voice stress 
responses to these relevant questions were compared with comparison questions such as 
“Have you ever driven over the posted speed limit?” (questions retrieved from the video of 
the original interrogation; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S6cN-mTZTjA). In such a lie 
test, stronger responding to the relevant question compared to the comparison questions is 
interpreted as an indication of deception. The opposite pattern is considered as an indication 
of truth telling. Results of the lie test in the Zimmerman case were taken as an indication that 
he spoke the truth. The police argued to have no reason to doubt the veracity of the self-
defense statement, and Zimmerman was released (for the aftermath of the case see e.g., 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shooting_of_Trayvon_Martin). This case illustrates the 
enormous potential of lie detectors. If accurate, they can lead to a huge saving of time and 
money and solve difficult cases quickly. At the same time, the Zimmerman case illustrates 
three key questions relevant for the use of lie detection methods: (1) How accurate are lie 
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tests? (2) What constitutes a proper baseline to which responses on critical questions can be 
compared? (3) Which psychological mechanisms underlie deception and its detection?  
Accuracies reported for lie tests vary greatly. In 2003, the National Research Council 
evaluated the validity of the widely used Control Question polygraph test (Reid, 1947) and 
concluded that “what is remarkable, given the large body of relevant research, is that claims 
about the accuracy of the polygraph made today parallel those made throughout the history of 
the polygraph: Practitioners have always claimed extremely high levels of accuracy, and these 
claims have rarely been reflected in empirical research” (p. 107). Importantly, although some 
lie tests show a predictive validity above chance level, empirical evidence has shown that they 
perform considerably below perfection (see e.g., Meijer, Verschuere, Gamer, Merckelbach, & 
Ben-Shakhar, 2016; National Research Council, 2003). Voice stress analysis as employed in 
the Zimmermann case even does not seem to perform above chance level in discerning lies 
from truth (Eriksson & Lacarda, 2007). 
There is a consensus that there exists no unique lie response (cf. Pinocchio’s nose), 
and therefore evaluating whether a response is truthful or not always requires its comparison 
to an appropriate “baseline” (Meijer et al., 2016). What constitutes an adequate baseline is, 
however, heavily debated. In the Zimmerman case, as in most commonly used lie tests, the 
critical questions and the comparison questions are readily discernable upon face value for 
both liars and truth tellers. This is undesirable because the critical questions are threatening 
for all, and may thus elicit a false positive response also in innocent suspects. 
Attempts to formulate a psychological theory explaining the expected response pattern 
in lie detection tests mostly build on the assumption of a unique relation between lying and 
stress. The basic assumption is that lying leads to stress and enhanced autonomic arousal, and 
that truth telling will not (or at least less; Ben-Shakhar, 2002; Vrij, 2008). The idea of 
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interpreting stress as a sign of deceit is popular and has a long tradition. Already in 1000 BC, 
the observation that fear leads to decreased saliva production was used to identify liars in 
China. Suspects were asked to chew dried rice and to spit it out. The more difficult this 
proved to be, the greater the chance that they were considered to be deceptive (Kleinmuntz & 
Szucko, 1984). Over centuries, the technologies to measure stress have advanced, but 
investigations of the relation between stress and deception have not. Although it is an 
intuitively appealing idea that liars display more stress, the possibility of a so-called Othello 
error (Ekman, 1985) is large: Interpreting his wife Desdemona’s stress as a sign of deceit, 
Shakespeare’s Othello failed to consider that stress may also reflect a truth teller’s fear of not 
being believed. In Shakespeare’s play, this error in judgment led to the death of Desdemona, 
illustrating the potentially dramatic consequences for innocent suspects.  
Taken together, many currently used lie detection tests perform below perfection, do 
not use a proper baseline, and are based on the problematic assumption of a strong 
relationship between stress and deception. Following Kurt Lewin’s (1951) suggestion that 
“There is nothing so practical as a good theory”, a very first step in the development of lie 
detection tools should be the development of a valid theory explaining why and how lying and 
truth telling differ. Such a theory is necessary, as it would allow to predict under which 
conditions lie tests are likely to result in valid conclusions and under which conditions they 
are not. A theoretical perspective that has gained increased attention in recent years is the 
cognitive view on lying. 
The cognitive approach to deception 
The cognitive approach to deception holds that lying is cognitively more challenging 
than truth telling. According to this view, what may differentiate lying from truth telling is the 
extent and nature of the required cognitive processes. There are several reasons why lying 
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may be cognitively more demanding than truth telling (Vrij et al., 2006; Christ et al., 2009). In 
comparison to truth tellers, liars may not simply retrieve a story from memory, but need to 
fabricate it. Liars have to be cautious not to contradict themselves or the knowledge of the 
person they are trying to deceive. To avoid such contradictions, they have to remember the 
truth, keep the truth active in memory, and yet at the same time prevent it from slipping out 
while communicating the lie. Finally, liars have to monitor their own behavior and that of 
their interaction partners in order to control behaviors that may be interpreted as lying. In 
sum, the cognitive view holds that deception is typically more cognitively demanding than 
truth telling (Ellwanger, Rosenfeld, Sweet, & Bhatt, 1996; Johnson, Barnhardt, & Zhu, 2004; 
Spence et al., 2004; Vrij, 2008; Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981; for an opposing 
view see e.g., McCornack, Morrison, Paik, Wisner, & Zhu, 2014; for boundary conditions see 
e.g., Walczyk, Harris, Duck, & Mulay, 2014).  
There is empirical support for the idea that lying has a cognitive cost. First, people 
report to experience lying as cognitively more demanding than truth telling (Caso, Gnisci, 
Vrij, & Mann, 2005; Vrij, Semin, & Bull, 1996). Second, brain imaging research shows that 
compared to truth telling, lying evokes greater activity in brain regions that are also active 
during complex cognitive tasks (i.e., dorsolateral prefrontal and inferior frontal regions). In 
contrast, no brain area has been found to be systematically more active for truth telling 
compared to lying (Abe, 2009; Christ, Van Essen, Watson, Brubaker, & McDermott, 2009; 
Gamer, 2011; Ganis & Keenan, 2009).1 Third, increasing cognitive load increases the 
occurrence of verbal, non-verbal, and para-verbal (e.g., voice tone, pitch, or pacing) cues of 
deception. For instance, letting both liars and truth tellers tell their stories in reverse order or 
asking them unanticipated questions burdens liars in particular, and increases the accuracy of 
observers in detecting liars (e.g., Lancaster, Vrij, Hope, & Waller, 2013; Vrij et al., 2008, 
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2009; Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, Jundi, & Granhag, 2012; for reviews of interview-techniques 
of cognition-based lie-detection, see Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2015; Vrij & Granhag, 2012). 
Three executive functions (Miyake et al., 2000) have been proposed to underlie the 
enhanced cognitive cost during deception (Christ et al., 2009; Spence et al., 2001). (1) The 
formulation of a credible lie often requires the truth to be retrieved and kept active in working 
memory. (2) The to-be-emitted lie contrasts with the truth, and may require response 
inhibition to prevent the truth from coming out and enable a deceptive response instead. (3) 
The transition from truthful communication to deception (and back) may require task 
switching. Although many studies have looked at these executive functions in isolation, the 
field is now slowly moving forward to formulate more integrative accounts. 
So far, there are a few comprehensive cognitive theories of deception (e.g., Gombos, 
2006; McCornack et al., 2014; Spence et al., 2004; Sporer & Schwandt, 2007; Sporer , 2016; 
Walczyk et al., 2014). The most elaborate theory is the Activation-Decision-Construction-
Action Theory (ADCAT) of deception (Walczyk et al., 2014). In this theory, lying involves 
four components or stages: (1) The activation of the truth from long-term memory, (2) the 
decision whether and how to deceptively alter the to-be-shared information, (3) the 
construction of the lie, and (4) the action itself. Importantly, each of these four components 
may add to the cognitive load during lying. The strength of the ADCAT is that it proposes 
moderators at each of the four stages, leading to testable hypotheses on the boundary 
conditions of the cognitive cost of deception.  
A key moderator in the ADCAT is motivation. Interpreted as the amount of 
cognitive resources a liar is willing to recruit, motivation is hypothesized to not only be 
influential at the decision stage, but also at the construction and action stages, where it may 
determine how much effort a liar is going to assign to lying successfully. Through its 
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influence on motivation, the relevance of the information a person lies about is also thought to 
moderate the effort invested in successful lying. Furthermore, Walczyk et al. (2014) proposed 
that lying becomes more difficult the more entrenched the truthful response is in the liar, 
whereas it becomes easier the more the deceptive response has been rehearsed and practiced 
(see also De Paulo et al., 2003). It is theorized that there may in fact be situations in which 
truth telling turns out to be cognitively more demanding than lying (McCornack et al., 2014; 
Walczyk et al., 2014). Identifying those situations is crucial in order to gain information about 
the validity and the boundaries of cognition-based methods of deception detection.    
Measuring deception with reaction times   
Departing from the logic of mental chronometry (Donders, 1969; for a review see 
Jensen, 2006), subtracting reaction times (RTs) for truthful responses from RTs for deceptive 
responses may provide useful information on the extent to which additional cognitive 
processes are required for successful lying. Although RTs have a long-standing tradition in 
experimental psychology, their use in deception research has been contested. Early attempts 
to employ RTs as deception measures made use of Jung’s Association Reaction Method 
(Jung, 1910). For instance, the Russian researcher Alexander Luria measured the time it took 
crime suspects to generate word associations to crime-related words compared to crime-
unrelated words (Luria, 1932). Interestingly, Luria observed longer RTs and larger RT 
variability in guilty suspects, which he interpreted as indicators of disturbed affect. He also 
proposed that his method could differentiate between guilty and innocent suspects. Other 
researchers have tested variants of the Association Reaction Method, but have failed to 
observe robust RT differences between lying and truth telling (Henke & Eddy, 1909; Marston, 
1920). After these disappointing results, a period of low interest in RTs as deception indices 
followed (ca. 1940 - 1990).  
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Two developments led to renewed interest. First, with the increased use of 
computerized measures, the measurement of RTs has become easy, accurate, and common. 
Second, new deception paradigms were developed, grounded in the cognitive approach to 
deception. Those paradigms aimed at overcoming shortcomings of earlier lie detection tests, 
for instance by more closely matching the critical (i.e., lie) and the control (i.e., truth) 
condition (e.g., Furedy, Davis, & Gurevich, 1988; Spence et al., 2001; see method section). 
Nevertheless, the results of RT studies remained mixed, with effects ranging from small or 
non-significant (e.g., Engelhard, Merckelbach, & van den Hout, 2003; Locker & Pratarelli, 
1997; Matsuda, Nittono, Hirota, Ogawa, & Takasawa, 2009; Meijer, Smulders, Merckelbach, 
& Wolf, 2007; Verschuere, Rosenfeld, Winograd, Labkovsky, & Wiersema, 2009) to very 
large (e.g., Debey, Verschuere, & Crombez, 2012; Seymour, Seifert, Shafto, & Mosmann, 
2000, Seymour & Kerlin, 2008; Spence et al., 2001, 2008; Van Bockstaele et al., 2012; 
Verschuere, Spruyt, Meijer, & Otgaar, 2011). The practical utility of RTs as deception indices 
has also been contested. On the one hand, it has been argued that RTs have many advantages 
over autonomic and neural measures, as they are cheap, easy, and quick to measure 
(Verschuere & De Houwer, 2011). On the other hand, critics have stated that RTs are under 
voluntary control and are thus not suited in deception contexts (e.g., Farwell & Donchin, 
1991; Gronau, Ben-Shakhar, & Cohen, 2005; Mertens & Allen, 2008; Sip et al., 2013).  
In order to get a more conclusive answer to the question whether RTs can pick up 
differences between lying and truth telling, a meta-analytic synthesis is warranted. A 
combination of data from multiple studies can overcome the restrictions and peculiarities of 
single studies and provides a more comprehensive view on the size and robustness of the RT 
deception effect (Chan & Arvey, 2012). Three meta-analyses have been published on this 
topic. Two large meta-analyses focused upon verbal, non-verbal, and para-verbal cues of 
deception during interview situations. The RT effects in these two meta-analyses were small 
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and non-significant (DePaulo et al., 2003; Zuckerman et al., 1981; d = 0.02, 95% CI [-0.06; 
0.10] and d = 0.13, respectively2). A possible reason for these disappointing results is that in 
the included studies, RTs were recorded under suboptimal conditions. This point was raised 
by Verschuere, Suchotzki, and Debey (2015), who argued that meaningful RT measurement 
must meet certain criteria. First, it needs to be precise (i.e., computer-based). Second, 
participants should be able to respond immediately after stimulus presentation and be 
instructed to respond as fast as possible. Third, RTs need to be averaged over multiple 
measurements, with a proposed minimum of about 20 measurements per condition (i.e., lying 
vs. truth telling). Unfortunately, none of the studies that were included in the two meta-
analyses mentioned above met these criteria: RTs were often assessed using stop-watches, 
participants were not prompted to respond as fast as possible but responded within the context 
of natural interview situations, and most studies employed relatively brief interactions with a 
very limited number of measurements. In more recent years, new computerized deception 
paradigms have been developed that overcome those limitations. 
The third meta-analysis reviewed studies using a computerized RT measure (Agosta & 
Sartori, 2013). This meta-analysis focused exclusively on the autobiographical Implicit 
Association Test (aIAT; see method section), and revealed a significant medium-sized 
average effect (D-IAT = 0.58, 95% CI [0.41; 0.73], k = 17; n = 412; with the D-IAT measure 
roughly corresponding to Cohen’s d, see Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). However, this 
meta-analysis was restricted to one particular paradigm. Furthermore, the analysis included 
studies in which participants were not aware of the deception detection context and were not 
instructed to deceive. This limits the generalizability and validity of the findings.   
The current meta-analysis 
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The current meta-analysis focuses on studies that report results of computerized RT 
measures from different RT deception paradigms. In doing so, we overcome what is known as 
the mono-measure bias (e.g., Smith, Fischer, & Fister, 2003). By using several deception 
measures instead of focusing on one, we aimed to comprehensively capture different aspects 
of lying while at the same time avoiding capturing effects that may only be specific to one 
paradigm. We combined results of RT deception paradigms that allow a within-subject 
comparison of truth telling and lying, resulting in estimates of the size, the precision, and the 
robustness of the RT deception effect. As we expected systematic differences between 
studies, we also investigated potential factors that may moderate the RT deception effects. In 
particular, we were interested in the moderating effects of variables that have been proposed 
to influence the cognitive load of lying, or may even reverse effects – indicating that in some 
situations truth telling may be cognitively more demanding than lying (Walczyk et al., 2014).  
Publication bias 
Publication bias, i.e. the tendency that large and significant effects are more likely to 
be published than small and non-significant effects, poses a problem in many research areas 
and may lead to overestimations of effect sizes in meta-analyses (e.g., Fanelli, 2012; 
Rosenthal, 1979; Sterling, 1959; Sterling, Rosenbaum, & Weinkam, 1995). We aimed to 
detect and, if necessary, correct our average effect size for the presence of publication bias 
using standard publication bias analyses (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2011; 
Duval & Tweedie, 2000; Egger, Smith, Schneider, & Minder, 1997). In addition, two other 
indicators of publication bias were taken into account.3 First, we investigated whether there 
are differences between studies that employ RT as a primary versus secondary measure. 
For example, fMRI studies with significant effects in BOLD responses may be published 
more easily, even if RT effects are not significant. We therefore expected larger effects in 
studies reporting RT as a primary measure compared to studies reporting RT as a secondary 
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measure. Second, we investigated the effect of publication year on the effect sizes. In many 
research areas, one can observe a decline in effect sizes over the years. This so-called “decline 
effect” (Schooler, 2011) or “Law of initial results” (Ioannidis, 2005) was found in a recent 
meta-analysis by Meijer, Klein Selle, Elber, and Ben-Shakhar (2014) on autonomic nervous 
system (ANS) and event-related brain potential (ERP) measures of concealed information4. 
Due to a higher likelihood of publication bias, the decline effect may be particularly present in 
studies that used RT as a primary measure as compared to studies that used RT as a secondary 
measure.  
Moderator analyses 
We wanted to explore the influence of potential moderator variables that can be 
related to the internal validity of the employed RT measures. Verschuere et al. (2015) 
proposed that in order to estimate the minimal time people need to initiate a truthful or 
deceptive response, participants must be instructed to respond as fast as possible. Hence, we 
coded whether speed instructions were provided to participants, and expected that studies in 
which speed instructions were given would yield larger effect sizes compared to studies in 
which speed instructions were not given.  
We also wanted to assess the influence of the stimulus presentation pace. On the one 
hand, slower pace may enable participants to better control their performance and thereby 
result in smaller RT deception effects. On the other hand, two studies that have 
experimentally manipulated the response-stimulus interval in a RT-based deception paradigm 
revealed larger RT deception effects for a slow compared to a fast stimulus presentation, 
possibly because slower stimulus presentation makes it more difficult for participants to focus 
on the task goal, i.e. deception (Debey et al., 2012). Based on the dual-process theory of Kane 
and Engle (2003) and Engle and Kane (2004), Debey et al. (2012) argued that their findings 
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indicated that two mechanisms contributed to the RT deception effect: The time consuming 
nature of the resolution of the conflict between truth telling and lying, and occasional lapses 
in goal-maintenance.  
A further moderator relates to the extent to which participants attended to the stimuli 
(Suchotzki, Verschuere, Crombez, & De Houwer, 2013). Some researchers designed their 
tasks in such a way that attention to the stimulus content is guaranteed (e.g., by using targets 
that required a special response, memory tests, catch trials, or paradigms requiring alternating 
responses). We expected those studies to result in larger effects compared to studies that did 
not guarantee attention to the stimulus content. 
In addition to moderators related to internal validity, we investigated a number of 
factors that are relevant from a theoretical or applied perspective. These factors have been 
proposed to influence or even reverse the cognitive cost of deception (De Paulo et al., 2003; 
Verschuere & De Houwer, 2010; Walczyk et al., 2014). It has been argued that the type of 
paradigm may affect the RT deception effect (Suchotzki et al., 2013; Verschuere & De 
Houwer, 2011). Several paradigms are available that allow a within-subject comparison 
between truthful and deceitful responses (i.e., the Concealed Information Test, the 
autobiographical Implicit Association Test, the Sheffield Lie Test, and the Differentiation of 
Deception Paradigm; see method section for detailed descriptions). We also investigated the 
influence of the total number of trials. From a psychometric point of view, one would expect 
more trials to be associated with enhanced reliability (Kleinberg & Verschuere, 2015). At the 
same time, more trials may lead to adaptation or habituation (Thompson, 2009) and may 
provide participants with more opportunities to practice their responses (De Paulo et al., 2003; 
Walczyk et al., 2014) or even to exert countermeasures (i.e., strategies that participants use to 
appear truthful; see e.g., Ben Shakhar, 2011). Previous findings regarding the effect of 
practice on the RT deception effect are inconclusive (Johnson, Barnhardt, & Zhu, 2005; 
LYING TAKES TIME       14 
 
Vendemia, Buzan, & Green, 2005). Research has also indicated that the proportion of truth 
and lie trials may be important. Larger proportions of truth trials are associated with larger 
RT deception effects in the Sheffield Lie Test (see method section; Van Bockstaele et al., 
2012, 2015; Verschuere et al., 2011). Comparable results have been found with ANS and ERP 
concealed information measures (Ben-Shakhar, 1977; Ben-Shakhar, Lieblich, & Kugelmass, 
1982; Hu, Hegeman, Landry, & Rosenfeld, 2012; Lieblich, Kugelmass, & Ben-Shakhar, 
1970). 
With regard to the motivation to deceive, there are two opposing hypotheses. The 
motivation impairment hypothesis (DePaulo, Kirkendol, Tang, & O'Brien, 1988) predicts that 
stronger motivation to avoid detection paradoxically leads to larger RT deception effects. This 
prediction was supported by the results of earlier deception and concealed information meta-
analyses, which found larger effects when participants received motivational instructions or 
an extra incentive to successfully avoid detection (Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2003; DePaulo et 
al., 2003; Meijer et al., 2014). However, the motivation impairment effect has not been found 
in all concealed information measures (e.g., using ERPs, Ellwanger et al., 1996; using RTs, 
Kleinberg & Verschuere, 2015) and has been challenged (Burgoon & Floyd, 2000). In RT 
deception paradigms, stronger motivation to deceive might lead participants to assign more 
resources to cognitive control (Walczyk et al., 2014). Stronger motivation may further lead to 
more and better attempts of participants to employ countermeasures and fake a truthful test 
outcome by slowing down their responses on truth trials. Additionally, as the relevance of the 
information about which participants lie is closely associated with participants’ motivation, 
the relevance of information can be expected to influence the RT effect size. Numerous 
studies have shown larger CIT effects for relevant compared to less relevant information (e.g., 
Abe et al., 2006; Carmel, Dayan, Naveh, Raveh, & Ben-Shakhar, 2003; Gamer, Kosiol, & 
Vossel, 2010; Jokinen, Santtila, Ravaja, & Puttonen, 2006; Lieblich, Ben-Shakhar, & 
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Kugelmass, 1976) and the same effect could be expected in RT paradigms. Yet, one could 
also expect information relevance to be related to participants’ efforts during the task.  
To enhance external validity, it is important for deception detection methods to be 
tested in populations that are similar to populations in which those methods may finally be 
used (i.e., forensic populations). We therefore aimed to examine whether there are differences 
in the size of the RT deception effect depending on the type of population from which the 
study sample was selected. Specifically, we wanted to compare three types of sample 
populations: Normal/student populations, forensic populations, and clinical populations. 
Finally, in order to provide an indication about the use of RT measures in applied deception 
contexts, we aimed to explore the vulnerability of RT deception measures to strategic 
manipulations (i.e., countermeasures). In countermeasure studies, participants usually 
receive information about the test principle, the data pattern that would indicate deceit, 
measures to counteract this pattern, and may get hands-on practice to implement those 
measures to reduce the RT deception effect. As the inclusion of such studies would likely 
mask the cognitive dynamics of lying, we performed an additional meta-analysis on 
countermeasures studies. As summarized by Ben-Shakhar (2011), nearly all known concealed 
and deception detection methods are vulnerable to countermeasures, which is why we also 
expected a considerably reduced effect.  
In sum, the current study provides a meta-analytic assessment of the RT signature of 
deception in computerized paradigms: It examines whether lies can be discerned from truth 
within the same participants, and whether factors related to publication bias, internal, external, 
and procedural validity moderate the cognitive cost of deception and hence influence the RT 
deception effect. 
Method 
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Literature search 
Studies were identified through a search of the electronic databases PsychLIT, Web of 
Science, and PubMed using the following search string: (“Guilty knowledge” OR “Concealed 
information” OR GKT OR CIT OR “guilty action” OR “memory detection” OR “Concealed 
knowledge” OR “decept*” OR “lie detection” OR “lie-detection” OR “decei*” OR “Sheffield 
lie test” OR “autobiographical IAT” OR “aIAT” OR “autobiographical implicit association 
test”) AND (“Reaction time*” OR “Response time*” OR “Response latenc*” OR ERP OR 
“Event related potentials” OR fMRI OR P300 OR scanner OR brain OR “neuro*”). In 
addition, the references of relevant review articles (Verschuere & De Houwer, 2011; 
Verschuere et al., 2015) and meta-analyses (Agosta & Sartori, 2013; DePaulo et al., 2003; 
Zuckerman et al., 1981) were searched for missing references, and the final list was checked 
by the co-authors. 
Inclusion criteria 
The following criteria were used to select studies for inclusion in the meta-analysis: 
1. The study was an experimental study reporting original data, and the full 
research report was published in English before July 2015 in a peer-reviewed 
journal. During an additional search, completed yet unpublished PhD theses 
were included. This search is described in more detail below. 
2. The study sample consisted of adults or the mean age of the sample was at 
least 18 years. 
3. The study reported results of a computer-based RT measure of deception. We 
also included studies that focused on other primary measures (e.g., ERPs, 
fMRI). Studies were excluded if no RT results were reported, or if RT was 
measured in suboptimal conditions. Examples for suboptimal conditions are 
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designs that allowed participants to prepare their responses during a delay 
between presentation of the crucial stimulus and the response (e.g., Ambach, 
Stark, Peper, & Vaitl, 2008a), or if the experimenter rather than the participant 
pushed the response buttons (e.g., Abe et al., 2006).  
4. Studies emphasized deception or information concealment through 
instructions. 
5. The study enabled a within-subject comparison of deceptive and truthful 
responses. For instance, studies were excluded if it was not specified (either by 
the experimenter or by the design) on which trials participants were supposed 
to lie or tell the truth (e.g., van Hooff, Sargeant, Foster, & Schmand, 2009; 
Greene & Paxton, 2009). 
6. The conditions included in the meta-analysis (deceptive vs. truthful responses) 
contained at least 20 presented trials, as estimates based on RT measures can 
be unreliable when the number of observations is limited (Verschuere et al., 
2015). 
7. The samples consisted of a minimum of 10 participants per condition. It is 
known that studies with small sample sizes are more susceptible to publication 
bias and tend to overestimate effect sizes (Sterne, Gavaghan, & Egger, 2000; 
Turner, Bird, & Higgins, 2013; Zhang, Xu, Ni, Zhang, & Xu, 2013). 
8. Conditions involving the use of rTMS, drugs, or alcohol administration, or 
instructions regarding the use of countermeasures were excluded. Such 
manipulations can be expected to mask the effect. In most of these cases, there 
were control conditions available that were included in our sample (e.g., 
Verschuere, Schuhmann, & Sack, 2012). Although not included in the main 
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sample, studies instructing countermeasure use were included in the additional 
countermeasure meta-analysis.   
9. Sufficient data for the computation of effect sizes had to be available. If a 
study reported RT results but did not contain sufficient information to calculate 
the effect size, the authors were contacted to provide the missing data. If this 
data could not be provided, the study was excluded. 
The electronic databases were searched for references on the 18th and 19th of 
November 2013. To update our sample, an additional search was conducted on the 8th and the 
9th of July 2015. Together, after the removal of duplicates, these searches resulted in 2003 
references. A two-step procedure was used. In a first step, one reviewer (the third and the first 
authors respectively for the first and the second searches) screened the abstracts of all 
references. The reviewer was not blind to authors, institutions, journals, and results. If there 
was any doubt about exclusion, the references were retained for the full text search. In this 
first step, 1653 references were excluded. The main reasons for exclusion were that these 
references were not peer-reviewed research articles, were irrelevant / unrelated to deception, 
did not employ computer-based measures, or did not report original data. In the second step, 
full copies of the remaining 350 references were obtained and read. Where there was doubt 
(40 references), a second reviewer (the first author and the third author for the first and the 
second search, respectively) also read the article. If no consensus could be reached, a third 
reviewer was consulted (the second or the last author). In 20 cases, an email was sent to the 
authors to ask for clarification on design features. Seventy publications were considered 
eligible for the analysis. The reasons for the exclusion of the 281 references from the full text 
search were as follows: (1) no original data (24 references), (2) participants were not required 
to deceive (76 references), (3) no within-subject comparison between lying and truth telling 
(42 references), (4) no computer-based RT paradigm and/or no report of RT results (106 
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references), (5) the study presented less than 20 trials per condition (19 references), (6) 
participants were taught countermeasures (1 reference) (7) results were based on a sample of 
less than 10 participants per group (10 references), (8) authors were asked for clarification, 
but did not reply to our request after two reminder emails (3 references). Note that as soon as 
the reviewer found one violation of an inclusion criterion, screening for other violations was 
stopped. 
The searches in previous reviews and through the authors resulted in 7 additional 
publications that fulfilled our criteria. To further limit publication bias, a search for 
unpublished PhD theses was performed on the 11th of July 2015. We searched the electronic 
database Dissertation Abstracts, using the same search terms and inclusion criteria as outlined 
above (criteria 2 – 9). Additionally, we contacted the authors that contributed data to our 
sample and authors who may have supervised PhD research on RT deception studies. We also 
sent a call for PhD theses containing unpublished RT deception data via Twitter and 
announced our search at the “Conference for Psychology and Law” (Nuremberg, 2015) and 
the “Decepticon Conference” (Cambridge, 2015), both of which are international conferences 
that are visited by deception researchers. This search resulted in 33 PhD theses, many of 
which were already published. Two PhD theses fulfilled our inclusion criteria and contained 
unpublished data from 8 independent studies.  
Taken together, the electronic and additional searches resulted in 79 eligible 
publications. In order to obtain all data necessary for the calculation of the effect sizes, the 
authors of 24 publications were contacted with the request to provide missing data. Most 
authors responded to this request. Six studies were excluded because the authors failed to 
provide clarifications on inconsistencies, or failed to send their data after two reminder emails 
(3 studies), or the authors stated that the data was no longer available (3 studies). Our final 
sample consisted of 73 publications, reporting a total of 115 independent studies. These 
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numbers refer to our main meta-analysis; the studies included in our additional 
countermeasure meta-analysis and further details on that meta-analysis are described in the 
result section. 
Coding system and coding decisions 
We used a standard coding system to code every study in terms of sample and design 
characteristics. The coding categories were developed a priori, but if necessary adapted in an 
iterative process.  
For sample characteristics, we coded year of publication, sample size (n), mean age of 
the sample, percentage of female participants, and whether participants were from a 
normal/student population, a forensic population, a clinical population, or a mixed forensic-
clinical population. We coded whether RTs were the primary or the secondary outcome 
measure of the study and whether a study was published or unpublished. For design 
characteristics, we coded whether participants were instructed to respond as fast as possible 
(No vs. Yes)5, the number of trials on which participants were instructed to lie, the number of 
trials on which participants were instructed to tell the truth, the absolute number of trials in 
the task, and the proportion of lie and truth trials (more lie trials, equal proportion, more truth 
trials). We also coded the inter trial interval - the interval from the beginning of one trial to 
the beginning of the next trial (<4000 ms, 4000-8000 ms, > 8000 ms). For cases in which the 
inter trial interval was dependent on the response speed, we used the mean RT of truth telling 
and lying in that particular study as an estimate. Furthermore, we coded the category of the 
critical information (Real crime; Mock crime; Autobiographical; Other)6, and its relevance 
[High (e.g., real crime, central mock crime details, or important autobiographical information 
such as first name, birth date etc.) vs. Low (e.g., peripheral mock crime information, trivial 
autobiographical information such as favourite colour, trivial semantic information, or other 
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trivial information)]. We coded the type of deception paradigm (Concealed Information Test, 
autobiographical Implicit Association Test, Sheffield Lie Test, or Differentiation of Deception 
Paradigm) and whether the task could be performed without paying attention to stimulus 
content (No vs. Yes). We also coded whether it was reported that the participants were given 
extra motivational instructions to lie [None, Motivational instructions (e.g., “try to beat the 
test”, “lie as convincingly as possible”), or an Incentive (e.g., extra money, extra credits) on 
top of the motivational instructions].  
Some additional data-extraction and coding decisions were made. First, when several 
test repetitions were administered without manipulating any of our moderating factors, we 
used the data that were collapsed across the different repetitions. Second, if a study reported 
sufficient data to calculate the effect sizes for subgroups or within-subject conditions (with 
manipulations that were not of interest for the current meta-analysis), but did not report the 
collapsed results, we coded the subgroups or different conditions separately (as independent 
or dependent samples, respectively). However, if the reported data were insufficient to 
calculate either effect size, we requested the authors to send us the data averaged over the 
respective groups or conditions. Authors were contacted to provide the means and standard 
deviations for lying and truth telling and the correlation (Pearson’s r) between these two 
conditions.  
Data-extraction and coding was conducted by one reviewer (the first author) using an 
excel sheet specifically designed for this meta-analysis. When in doubt, a second or third 
reviewer (the second or last author) was asked to resolve disagreements. The final coding 
reflects the consensus of the coding. 
Paradigms 
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We only included paradigms that allowed a within-subject comparison of truth telling 
and lying. All studies that were included were categorized as one of four different paradigms: 
The Concealed Information Test, the autobiographical Implicit Association Test, the Sheffield 
Lie Test, or the Differentiation of Deception Paradigm. 
The Concealed Information Test (CIT; Lykken, 1959) is a method designed to 
measure recognition of critical (e.g., crime-relevant) information. In CIT experiments, 
participants are usually instructed to hide particular knowledge (e.g., about crime-related 
facts, autobiographical details, or a card picked from a card set) from the experimenter. 
During the CIT, participants are presented with stimuli referring to this knowledge, embedded 
among well-matched irrelevant stimuli. Crucially, in most RT-based CITs (Seymour et al., 
2000), participants are instructed to deny knowledge of both types of stimuli (i.e., respond 
“no”), meaning that they lie on trials on which critical stimuli are presented and tell the truth 
on trials on which irrelevant stimuli are presented. In most of these CIT versions, a third type 
of stimuli is also used. These so-called target stimuli are mostly learned just before the 
administration of the CIT and participants are instructed to admit their recognition (i.e., 
respond “yes”). These stimuli guarantee that participants have to process the content of the 
stimuli and cannot perform the task by simply responding “no” to every single stimulus. 
Although target stimuli also require truthful responses, they are not taken into account for the 
calculation of the CIT-effect (RT critical stimuli – RT irrelevant stimuli) and for the lie-truth contrast in 
our meta-analysis.  
The autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT; Sartori, Agosta, Zogmaister, 
Ferrara, & Castiello, 2008) is a method designed to reveal which of two contrasting 
autobiographical events is true. In the aIAT, participants are asked to classify four different 
types of stimuli using two response keys. The four different types of stimuli are true 
statements (e.g., “I’m currently doing a computerized test”), false statements (e.g., “I’m 
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currently reading a crime novel”), and statements related to two contrasting autobiographical 
events (e.g., “I robbed the bank” versus “I was at the movies”). These statements have to be 
classified into four categories, TRUE vs. FALSE, and for instance in the previously used 
example, I ROBBED THE BANK vs. I WAS AT THE MOVIES. Crucially, the aIAT always 
consists of two test blocks during which different categories share the same response keys. In 
one block, true statements and statements relating to one autobiographical event are mapped 
to one response key and false statements and statements relating to the other autobiographical 
event are mapped to the other key. In the other block, the mapping is reversed. The idea 
behind the aIAT is that the FALSE and TRUE categories interfere with the categorization of 
the statements referring to the two autobiographical events under investigation. Thereby, 
participants are indirectly deceiving when categorizing the autobiographical true event (e.g., 
the robbery) into the FALSE category and the autobiographical false event (e.g., going to the 
movie) into the TRUE category. In our meta-analysis, we included aIAT experiments in 
which participants were told about the deception context of the experiment and were 
explicitly instructed to hide or conceal their true autobiographical memory. We coded the 
block in which both types of true statements were mapped to the same response key and both 
types of false statements were mapped to the other response key as truthful control responses, 
and the block with the reversed mapping as deceptive responses. 
The Sheffield Lie Test (SLT; Spence et al., 2001) is a paradigm in which participants 
are instructed to lie or tell the truth about a set of stimuli, depending on a cue (e.g., lie to 
questions in blue, tell the truth to questions in yellow). Importantly, in the SLT, participants 
tell the truth and lie about the same set of stimuli, which served as the crucial contrast 
included in our meta-analysis. 
The remaining paradigms that contrasted lying and truth telling on different items 
were variants of the Differentiation of Deception Paradigm (DoD; Furedy et al., 1988). In 
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the DoD, unlike in the SLT, stimuli do not form their own control. Thus, participants are cued 
or instructed to lie about one stimulus set, and to tell the truth about another stimulus set. One 
example is the old/new word paradigm, in which participants categorize words as old (i.e., 
already seen) and new (i.e., not yet encountered). In the deceptive condition, participants are 
instructed to lie (i.e., say “old” for a subset of “new” words and say “new” for a subset of 
“old” words), whereas in the truth condition they are instructed to respond truthfully. For the 
DoD, the crucial contrast that we included is the comparison between the deceptive and the 
most adequately matched truthful responses (technically one also tells the truth to filler or 
catch trials that are used to assure attention, but such trials were excluded as they differ 
markedly from the deceptive responses). 
Meta-analytic procedures 
All our analyses and computations were carried out using Comprehensive Meta-
Analysis software, Version 2.2.050 (Biostat, Englewood, NJ) and our meta-analytic approach 
is based on Borenstein et al. (2011).The effect size used in our meta-analysis was the 
standardized paired difference (Cohen’s d for paired data; Borenstein et al., 2011; Dunlap, 
Cortina, Vaslow, & Burke, 1996; Morris & DeShon, 2002). As a rule of thumb, Cohen (1988) 
proposed 0.20, 0.50, and 0.80 as thresholds for “small”, “moderate”, and “large” effects, 
respectively. The standardized paired difference was calculated by subtracting the mean RT 
for truth telling from the mean RT for lying. This difference was then divided by the pooled 
standard deviation. The pooled standard deviation was corrected for the correlation between 
lying and truth telling (SDpooled = √SDlie2 + SDtruth2 – 2 * rlie,truth * SDlie * SDtruth). If the standard 
error was given instead of the standard deviation, the following formula was used SD = SE * 
√n.  
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When the correlation was not available or could not be derived from the results, we 
calculated and imputed the mean correlation between lying and truth telling across all studies 
for which correlations were available (k = 36; n =766) using a meta-analytic approach. 
Cochran’s Q indicated a significant heterogeneity between correlations, Q(35) = 134.597, p < 
.001 (I2 = 74 %). Further analyses revealed that this heterogeneity in correlations was partly 
explained by differences between paradigms, Q(3) = 10.565, p = .014. Post hoc comparisons 
revealed significant differences between the correlations of the aIAT studies and all studies 
using other paradigms (all p’s < .02). There were no significant differences between the mean 
correlations in the other three paradigms (all p’s > .80). We therefore decided to calculate and 
impute the correlations for aIAT studies separately, r = .698 (95% Confidence Interval (95% 
CI) [.527; .815], k = 3; n = 78). There was no aIAT study in which a correlation needed to be 
imputed. The imputed correlation for all other paradigms was r = .880 (95% CI [.838; .911], k 
= 33; n = 688).  
When the means and the standard deviations for both conditions were not available, 
but the t-values for the crucial contrast (lying vs. truth telling) were reported, d was derived 
from this t-value (k = 2; n = 73; Morris & DeShon, 2002). If only an F-value for the main 
effect of lying vs. truth telling was given, the t-value was calculated as t = √F and d was 
derived from this t-value (k = 22; n = 551). Standardized paired differences with a positive 
sign (+) indicate effects of longer RTs for lying compared to truth telling, whereas effect sizes 
with a negative sign (-) indicate effects in the opposite direction. 
In our meta-analysis, we took into account the sampling error of each sample. Effect 
sizes were weighted by the inverse of the estimated sampling variance, whereby effect sizes 
derived from larger samples gain more weight than effect sizes derived from smaller samples 
(Borenstein et al., 2011). For the calculation of the average effect size across all moderators, 
we chose a random effects model. When reporting effect sizes (d), we always provide the 
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95% CIs, the number of independent studies (k), and the total number of participants (n). We 
applied Cochran’s Q test to judge the degree of heterogeneity in effect sizes (Borenstein et al., 
2011). We also provide I2, which denotes the percentage of observed variance that is due to 
real differences between studies and as such may be explained by moderating variables. 
According to Higgins, Thompson, Deeks, and Altman (2003), 25%, 50%, and 75% could be 
considered as low, moderate, and high scores for I2, respectively. 
Publication bias was assessed using a funnel plot, which depicts the effect size of each 
study on the x-axis vs. its precision (e.g., the inverse of the standard error) on the y-axis. The 
rationale for a funnel plot is that if a meta-analysis captured all relevant studies, the dispersion 
of the studies is expected to be symmetrical. Asymmetry, especially at the bottom of the plot, 
is taken as an indication of missing studies and therefore as an indication of a publication bias 
(e.g., Borenstein et al., 2011) or a file drawer problem (Rosenthal, 1979). The presence of a 
publication bias usually leads to an overestimation of the mean effect size. To get an estimate 
of publication bias, we first statistically evaluated the relationship between effect size and 
sample size with the Egger test (Egger et al., 1997), a regression analysis predicting the 
standardized effects (effect size / standard error) from precision (1 / standard error). When 
there was a significant result (i.e., a significant intercept), we used the Trim and Fill method 
(Duval & Tweedie, 2000) to impute the estimated effect sizes of missing studies and then re-
compute the average effect size. This provides an estimate of the average effect size had the 
funnel plot been symmetrical. 
To address whether variations in effect sizes can be explained by categorically coded 
variables, we performed moderator analyses using a mixed effects model. Such analyses can 
be considered as a meta-analytic ANOVA analogue, as the variance in effect sizes is 
partitioned into the portion explained by the categorical variable (QB) as an indicator of 
variability between group means, and the residual portion (QW) as an indicator of variability 
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within groups. QB is tested for significance against a chi-square distribution with df = k - 1. A 
significant between-groups effect indicates that the variance in effect sizes is at least partially 
explained by the moderator variable. Moderator levels with five or less studies were not 
included in these analyses. If the moderator analysis involved more than two valid groups, 
simple contrasts were applied in order to determine significant differences between groups. 
Note that this significance test is not identical to the test of overlap of confidence intervals 
around the respective means. That is, even in the case of confidence interval overlap, 
between-group differences can be statistically significant (Cumming & Finch, 2005; Estes, 
1997). This is because the between-groups test is based on a joint estimate of the standard 
error of the difference between means, whereas confidence intervals around a single mean do 
not reflect between-groups information. In that context, the confidence intervals should be 
best interpreted as providing information about the precision of single effect size estimates 
and their difference from zero (Rouder & Morey, 2005). 
To maintain the independence of the effect sizes used in our meta-analysis (Lipsey & 
Wilson, 2001), whenever necessary, we averaged effect sizes across within-subject conditions 
(Hedges & Olkin, 1985). When this turned out to be impossible, such as for a moderator 
analysis including studies with two within-subject conditions that differed on the respective 
moderator variable, we only used the data from the moderator category that contained the 
least studies for that respective analysis to increase power in that particular category (see Bar-
Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Van Ijzendoorn, 2007; Crombez, Van 
Ryckeghem, Eccleston, & Van Damme, 2013). Finally, for the continuously coded variables 
(i.e., the publication year and the absolute number of trials), we performed meta-regressions 
using the methods of moments procedure (Thompson & Higgins, 2002). The outcome of this 
meta-regression is reported as a point estimate of the slope and the significance of that slope.  
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Seventy-three publications reporting 115 independent studies were initially included in 
the meta-analysis. Screening the data set for outliers revealed 1 study from 1 publication with 
an effect size that strongly deviated from the average effect size (> 125 SDs; d = -6.912; 95% 
CI [-8.829; -4.994] for Langleben et al., 2005). Closer inspection revealed that in this study, a 
paradigm was used in which the crucial comparison of lying vs. truth telling was confounded 
with the ratio of yes vs. no responses. Yes responses were infrequent (1:10), and only used for 
truth trials, whereas No responses were frequent (9:10) and used for lie and filler trials. As the 
effect size of this study was an outlier, we decided to exclude it from further analyses. As a 




Of the 114 included studies, 34 used the CIT, 9 used the aIAT, 55 used the SLT, and 
16 used variants of the DoD. All but one study were published after 2000, indicating the 
increased use and report of computer-based RT as a primary or secondary measure of 
deception. The distribution of all coded categorical variables can be found in Table 2.  
Based on the studies for which the RT means were available (k = 90), the overall 
average RT difference between lying and truth telling was 115 ms, 95 % CI [103; 126]. More 
specifically, it was 49 ms, 95 % CI [41; 57] for the CIT (k = 32), 149 ms, 95 % CI [53; 245] 
for the aIAT (k = 3), 180 ms, 95 % CI [151; 209] for the SLT (k = 47), and 106 ms, 95 % CI 
[67; 145] for the DoD (k = 8).  
Overall effect size 
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We computed the average standardized paired difference across all studies (k = 114; n 
= 3307). The results revealed a large and significant overall average effect size, d = 1.256, 
95% CI [1.137; 1.374]. The effect sizes of the single studies and the average effect size across 
all studies are provided in Table 1. Caution is warranted when interpreting the average effect 
size, as Cochran’s Q revealed large heterogeneity in the sample of studies, Q(113) = 697.638, 
p < .001, justifying our a priori chosen random effects model. I2 indicated that about 84 % of 
the observed variance between effect sizes was caused by systematic differences between 
studies, and this warranted the search for potential moderators of the RT deception effect. 
- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE - 
Publication bias analysis 
Publication bias was assessed with the funnel plot depicted in Figure 1. Graphical 
inspection of the plot revealed a slight asymmetry, especially at the bottom of the plot. This 
observation was supported by the significant result of the Egger test, with the value of the 
intercept = 2.747, p < .001. The trim and fill method revealed the need to impute 23 missing 
studies in order to eliminate this asymmetry. Recalculating the average effect size after the 
imputation of the missing studies revealed a lower, but still large and significant estimate of 
the overall average effect size, d = 1.049; 95% CI [0.930; 1.169]. 
- INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE - 
Moderator analyses 
Table 2 provides Cochran’s Q for each of the categorical moderators, as well as the 
proportion of the variance of the RT deception effect that they account for. Furthermore, it 
provides the effect size and the Q statistic for each level of the variable, indicating whether 
there is still unexplained systematic variance left. Results of meta-regressions (for continuous 
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moderator variables) are reported in the text. A complete table showing the coding of all 
moderator variables for each study is available on https://osf.io/sphg3/#. 
As an additional measure of publication bias, we investigated whether studies that 
reported RT as a primary measure resulted in higher effect sizes than studies that reported RT 
as a secondary measure, and whether there was an influence of publication year. Results 
revealed a larger mean effect size in studies that reported RT as a primary measure, d = 1.354, 
95% CI [1.223; 1.486], compared to studies that measured RT as a secondary measure, d = 
1.064, 95% CI [0.854; 1.274], Q(1) = 5.271, p = .022. This estimate is similar to the corrected 
d value obtained with the trim and fill method, thereby providing further evidence for a 
publication bias, which slightly inflated the average effect size estimate.  
Excluding unpublished studies, a meta-regression using the method of moments 
procedure revealed a significant effect of publication year, with the point estimate of the slope 
= 0.038, 95% CI [0.003; 0.073], p = .032. The significant slope of the meta-regression line on 
the effect sizes indicates that effect sizes increased with d = 0.038 per (later) year of 
publication. Separating studies that reported RT as a primary measure and studies that 
reported RT as a secondary measure revealed that the significant effect of publication year 
was only present in the studies using RT as a primary measure (point estimate of slope = 
0.057, 95% CI [0.016; 0.097], p = .006). The significant slope of the meta-regression line for 
the effect sizes of the studies that reported RT as a primary measure indicates an increase in 
effect size of d = 0.057 per (later) year of publication within this subgroup. There was no 
significant effect of publication year in studies using RTs as secondary measure (point 
estimate of slope = -0.0004, 95% CI [-0.058; 0.058], p = .989).  
Next, we investigated the influence of speed instructions, measures to ensure attention 
towards stimulus content, and population. For the calculation of the effect of speed 
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instructions, 3 studies (from 2 publications) could not be included as the authors did not 
respond to our request for clarification (k = 2) or the information was no longer available (k = 
1). The results indicated no significant difference between studies in which instructions to 
respond as fast as possible were given, d = 1.285, 95% CI [1.160; 1.410], compared to studies 
in which no such instructions were given, d = 0.971, 95% CI [0.642; 1.300], Q(1) = 3.048, p = 
.081. No moderator analysis could be run for whether a paradigm guaranteed that participants 
could not divert their attention from the stimuli, as there was only one study in which no such 
measures were taken (Matsuda et al., 2009). Similarly, it was impossible to assess the 
influence of the population that the participants belonged to, as there were only 2 studies with 
a clinical sample (Mameli et al., 2013), and only 2 studies with a combined clinical / forensic 
sample (Jiang et al., 2013; Kaylor-Hughes et al., 2011). 
Next, we investigated a number of procedural moderators. Importantly, we found a 
significant overall effect of paradigm on the effect sizes, Q(3) = 9.059, p = .029. Post hoc 
comparisons revealed that the mean effect size for aIAT studies was with d = 0.822, 95% CI 
[0.538; 1.106] significantly smaller than the three other paradigms (all p’s < .04). There were 
no significant differences between the other three paradigms (all p’s > .78). 
For the analysis of the effect of the inter trial interval, 21 studies (from 8 publications) 
were excluded because the information was not reported. Our results did not reveal a 
significant effect of the length of the inter trial interval, Q(2) = 2.563, p = .278. There was 
also no significant effect of the absolute number of trials on the effect sizes (point estimate of 
slope = 0.0003, 95% CI [-0.0004; 0.0010], p = .366). For the calculation of the influence of 
the proportion of lie trials on the effect sizes, we excluded 6 studies (from 4 publications) in 
which the proportion of lie trials could not be calculated. Furthermore, we could not include 
the studies belonging to the category “more lie trials” in our analysis, as there were only 2 
studies available. Contrary to our prediction, our results revealed a larger average effect size 
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in studies using an equal proportion, d = 1.441, 95% CI [1.271; 1.612], compared to studies 
using more truth trials, d = 1.184, 95% CI [1.014; 1.355], Q(1) = 4.367, p = .037.  
Stimulus relevance did not produce a statistically significant effect Q(1) = 2.560, p = 
.110. It is possible that stimulus relevance is especially important in CIT designs, where 
relevant items are more likely to draw attention. We therefore ran an additional exploratory 
moderator analysis for stimulus relevance only for the studies using the CIT. Within the CIT 
studies, there was indeed a significant effect, Q(1) = 11.327, p = .001, with a larger average 
effect size in studies using relevant stimuli, k = 26, n = 831, d = 1.595, 95% CI [1.336, 1.854], 
compared to studies using less relevant stimuli, k = 8, n = 218, d = 0.743, 95% CI [0.319, 
1.166]. 
Motivation to deceive had a statistically significant effect on the average effect size, 
Q(2) = 6.439, p = .040. However, there were only 6 studies in which participants were 
motivated with an incentive. While post hoc comparisons revealed no significant differences 
between studies in which participants were motivated with an incentive and the other two 
categories (p’s > .23), they did reveal a smaller average effect size in studies in which it was 
reported that participants were motivated to lie as convincingly as possible compared to 
studies in which no extra motivation for participants was reported, Q(1) = 6.036, p = .014. 
This finding is in contrast with the results reported in CIT studies using ANS (Ben-Shakhar & 
Elaad, 2003; Meijer et al., 2014) and ERP measures (Ellwanger et al., 1996), and we therefore 
additionally examined the effect of motivation using only CIT studies. This analysis, in which 
we excluded the 2 CIT studies that reported having motivated participants with an incentive, 
revealed a still numerically smaller average effect size for CIT studies that reported 
motivational instructions, k = 10, n = 274, d = 1.110, 95% CI [0.684; 1.536], compared to 
studies in which no motivational instructions were reported, k = 22, n = 723, d = 1.386, 95% 
CI [1.084; 1.687], yet here the difference was not significant, Q(1) = 1.073, p = .300. 
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- INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE - 
Dependency analyses 
Finally, in order to check for dependencies between the assessed categorical variables, 
we calculated Cramer’s V as measure of the strength of the association between moderator 
variables. Cramer’s V also serves as an effect size, with .10, .30, and .50 as thresholds for 
small, moderate, and large associations. As can be seen in Table 3, dependencies tended to be 
medium to large. Most importantly, we observed significant associations between motivation 
and paradigm (Cramer’s V = .45, p < .001), motivation and stimulus proportion (Cramer’s V = 
.38, p < .01), and paradigm and stimulus proportion (Cramer’s V = .74, p < .001). The 
distribution of most variables was unequal for the different paradigms. 
- INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE - 
Countermeasure meta-analysis 
From an applied perspective, it is important to determine whether the use of 
countermeasures allows participants to influence their results in RT deception paradigms. 
Therefore, we conducted an additional meta-analysis summarizing studies that fulfilled our 
inclusion criteria (except for criterion 8) but in which participants were instructed to employ 
countermeasures. Studies were coded as countermeasure studies when information about the 
test rationale or how to beat the test was given to participants. We included all studies that 
measured and reported RTs, independent of whether RTs were the primary or a secondary 
outcome measure. This also means that countermeasure instructions did not need to be 
specific for RTs. Examples of RT-specific countermeasure instructions are slowing down 
truth RTs (Verschuere, Prati, & De Houwer, 2009; Seymour et al., 2000). Examples of non 
RT-specific countermeasures are applying pressure to toes during truth trials (Mertens & 
Allen, 2008). As can be seen in Table 4, this search resulted in 17 independent studies, with 
LYING TAKES TIME       34 
 
384 participants. Of those studies, 9 used the aIAT, 5 used the CIT, and 3 studies used the 
SLT. Twelve studies measured RTs as primary measures (9 aIATs, 2 SLTs, and 1 CITs), and 
5 studies measured RTs as secondary measures (4 CITs, 1 SLT). Summarizing those studies 
resulted in a small and non-significant effect size, d = 0.128, 95% CI [-0.172; 0.429]. The 
Egger test did not reveal an indication for publication bias (value of the intercept = -0.186, p = 
.941). Cochran’s Q revealed a large heterogeneity in the sample of studies, Q(16) = 104.162, 
p < .001 and I2 indicated that about 85 % of the observed variance between effect sizes was 
caused by systematic differences between studies. Due to the relatively small sample size, we 
refrained from conducting further moderator analyses.7 
- INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE - 
Discussion 
Lie detection has enormous potential, but faces great challenges. Facing the limitations 
of traditional lie detection approaches and formulating a psychological theory of how and 
under which circumstances lying and truth telling differ may be a first step towards the 
development of evidence-based lie tests. An emerging theory of deception holds that lying is 
typically more cognitively demanding than truth telling. We included 114 studies with 3307 
participants in our meta-analysis to test the key hypothesis of the cognitive perspective of 
deception that lying takes time. 
Our meta-analysis revealed a significant and large standardized paired RT difference 
between truthful and deceptive responses. This result may seem surprising as two earlier 
meta-analyses (DePaulo et al., 2003; Zuckerman et al., 1981) came to the opposite 
conclusion. These other meta-analyses, however, investigated a number of different verbal 
and non-verbal behavioral deception indices during interviews. As pointed out by Verschuere 
et al. (2015), RT measurement conditions in interview situations are suboptimal. RTs require 
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precise measurement, a design that allows participants to respond immediately after the 
stimulus presentation, and a sufficient number of observations. Accordingly, we restricted our 
analysis to studies that measured RT in such optimal conditions. Consequently, this resulted 
in none of the studies included in the two previous meta-analyses being included in the 
current meta-analysis. The RT deception effect may thus be restricted to computerized 
paradigms that fulfill minimal quality criteria for RT recordings. The effect does not 
necessarily generalize to face to face interview contexts. 
A concern for the interpretation of the results of our meta-analysis is the presence of 
publication bias, with mostly positive results finding their way into academic journals. 
Therefore, the average RT deception effect in our meta-analysis is likely to overestimate the 
true effect. Nevertheless, there are some indications that the overestimation may not be 
substantial. After correcting for publication bias using the trim and fill method, our analysis 
still revealed a large and significant estimate for the RT deception effect (d = 1.049). The 
presence of a publication bias is also substantiated by the observation that effect sizes were 
larger in studies reporting RT as a primary measure compared to studies reporting RT as a 
secondary measure. It seems reasonable to assume that publication bias is especially present 
in the former, whereas the latter do not rely as much on the statistical significance of their RT 
results. Nevertheless, the average effect size in studies using RTs as secondary measure 
remains large (d = 1.064), and is in fact comparable to the estimate for the corrected effect 
size provided earlier. We did not find a decline of the effect size in studies with RT as the 
primary measure. We had expected this as such an effect has been observed in many research 
areas (Ioannidis, 2005). We can only speculate about this unexpected finding. As mentioned 
above, RT measures of deception have been faced with much scepticism for a long time. It is 
not until recently that more and more attention and trust has been placed in RTs as measures 
LYING TAKES TIME       36 
 
of deception. The increased use of RT deception measures is likely to have improved the 
quality of the measurements, paradigms, and analyses.  
Despite the presence of a publication bias in the RT deception literature, the impact of 
this bias seems to be only modest, and correcting for this bias still revealed a large and 
significant RT deception effect. Even so, the observed publication bias calls for our attention. 
Publication bias is observed in many research areas, but it may have especially severe 
consequences in applied deception detection settings. Getting unbiased estimates of effect 
sizes and correct classification rates is essential to make informed decisions as to whether or 
not deception detection techniques should be implemented in applied contexts, as well as to 
determine the weight that should be given to their results (e.g., by police investigators, juries, 
or judges). Fortunately, attention to publication bias has grown (Ioannidis, 2006; Nosek, 
Spies, & Motyl, 2012). Study pre-registration may help to prevent publication bias (Pashler & 
Wagenmakers, 2012) and the importance of reporting and publishing all well-conducted 
research, irrespective of whether it yielded statistically significant results, cannot be 
overstated.  
What moderated the RT deception effect?  
The RT deception effect varied substantially between studies. We were able to identify 
two important moderators of the RT deception effect: The paradigm and motivational 
instructions to lie as convincingly as possible.  
By providing RT differences and average effect sizes for each of the four included 
paradigms, our meta-analysis provides benchmarks for future research and power analyses. 
Comparisons between the different types of paradigms revealed a significantly smaller effect 
size for the aIAT, compared to the other three paradigms. This is interesting considering the 
very large accuracy rates that are reported in several aIAT studies (above 90 % in the review 
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of Agosta and Sartori, 2013). One explanation for the smaller effect size of the aIAT 
compared to the other paradigms may be found in its specific design. Whereas the other three 
paradigms rely, in most cases, on designs in which the two contrasted conditions (truth telling 
and lying) are presented randomly intermixed, truthful and deceptive conditions in the aIAT 
are presented in two different blocks. As a consequence, the aIAT may be more vulnerable to 
participants’ attempts to control their behavior, as they can try to apply the same strategy 
(e.g., speeding up their deceptive responses or slowing down their truthful responses) to an 
entire block, instead of having to flexibly switch between strategies. Studies have indeed 
shown that the aIAT is vulnerable to such strategic manipulations (Agosta et al., 2011; Hu et 
al., 2012; Verschuere et al., 2009). It is noteworthy to further mention that so far, most aIAT 
studies were conducted by the developers of the aIAT. Studies completed in the same lab may 
be more similar to each other than studies completed in different labs. It therefore remains 
important to attempt to replicate these results in different laboratories (for a recent direct 
independent replication see Verschuere and Kleinberg, 2016). 
Whereas the aIAT resulted in a significantly lower average RT effect size compared to 
the CIT, the SLT, and the DOD, we found no significant differences between the latter three 
paradigms. This finding may be surprising given that those paradigms vary in the type of 
stimuli that are used (e.g., words vs. sentences), the control conditions (e.g., different vs. same 
stimuli), and the presumed underlying theoretical mechanisms (e.g., the orienting response for 
the CIT, executive functioning for the DoD and the SLT). Nevertheless, these paradigms 
share the same contrast between lying and truth telling. Our meta-analysis also revealed a 
numerically lower effect size for the RT CIT (d = 1.297, 95% [1.060; 1.535]), compared to 
the average effect size for the most often used ANS concealed information measure, skin 
conductance (d = 1.55, 95% [1.41; 1.69] and d = 1.55, 95% [1.44; 1.66] in Ben-Shakhar & 
Elaad, 2003, and Meijer et al., 2014, respectively). However, this comparison should be 
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treated with caution because the meta-analyses fundamentally differ with regard to their focus 
on within- or between-subject designs. Whereas we included only within-subject 
comparisons, the previous CIT meta-analyses either combined between and within-subject 
designs or only included between-subject designs. In order to compare skin conductance and 
RT measures, more research is needed in which these measures are simultaneously assessed, 
preferably under the most optimal conditions for each measure (e.g., Verschuere, Crombez, 
Degrootte, & Rosseel, 2010). Combining RTs and skin conductance in concealed information 
tests seems promising, as recent research suggests a dissociation between those measures: 
RTs seem to primarily tap into response inhibition processes, whereas skin conductance 
measures seem to tap more into orienting processes (Klein Selle et al., 2016; Suchotzki, 
Verschuere, et al., 2015). 
When participants were motivated to lie as convincingly as possible or to try to beat 
the test (without being taught countermeasures), the average RT deception effect was smaller. 
This finding is at odds with the motivation impairment theory (DePaulo et al., 1988). The 
motivation impairment effect has initially been observed in research using verbal and non-
verbal cues of deception, where a stronger motivation to lie paradoxically led to stronger 
differences between lying and truth telling (DePaulo et al., 2003), possibly due to greater 
pressure to lie successfully. The motivation impairment effect has also been observed in CIT 
studies using skin conductance measures (Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2003; Meijer et al., 2014), 
but not with RTs (Kleinberg & Verschuere, 2015) or event-related potentials (Ellwanger et 
al., 1996). There are at least two possible explanations for the detrimental role of motivation 
on the RT deception effect. First, instructions to beat the test may have led to more and better 
attempts of participants to employ countermeasures and fake a truthful test outcome (Ben 
Shakhar, 2011). Second, motivation has been shown to improve executive functioning 
(Hajcak, Moser, Yeung, & Simons, 2005; Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012; Legault & Inzlicht, 
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2013; Muraven & Slessareva, 2003), and may thus facilitate a cognitively demanding task 
such as lying. Motivated liars may be more focused on their task goal (i.e., to lie effectively; 
Debey et al., 2012), may pay more attention to the task at hand (i.e., lying), and invest more 
effort in self-control and the effective suppression of the prepotent truth response (Spence et 
al., 2001). Our finding also provides empirical support for the role of motivation in Walczyk 
et al.’s ADCAT and their prediction that the motivation to deceive determines the amount of 
cognitive resources that participants are willing to invest in lying (Walczyk et al., 2014). 
These two possible explanations for the effect of motivation can be experimentally 
differentiated. If the motivation effect is related to better executive functioning, motivated 
participants should be characterized by faster lie responses compared to unmotivated 
participants. If the motivation effect is related to more successful faking attempts, motivated 
participants should show RT slowing for truth responses.  
We found a significant effect of the proportion of truth vs. lie trials, yet surprisingly 
studies using an equal proportion of truth and lie responses tended to result in a larger average 
effect size compared to studies using more truth trials. A closer inspection of the data revealed 
that the proportion factor was confounded with the motivation factor: Studies with more truth 
trials were more likely to be studies in which participants were instructed to lie as 
convincingly as possible. The use of motivational instructions resulted in a smaller effect size 
and this may have counteracted the expected proportion effect.  
Due to the small number of studies, no moderator analyses could be conducted on the 
role of stimulus attention and population. The length of the inter trial interval, stimulus 
relevance, and the absolute number of trials did not moderate the RT deception effect. It is 
important to note that the absence of an effect of these variables cannot be taken as evidence 
for no effect, and some of those moderator effects may become significant with increased 
power. For instance, our data were not entirely conclusive on whether instructing participants 
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to respond as fast as possible results in a larger average effect size or not (p = .081), and more 
primary research also manipulating such instructions within one study is necessary. 
Is lying always more demanding than truth telling?  
A remarkable finding in our main meta-analysis is that none of the significant 
moderators led to a reversed RT deception effect. Even when a moderator significantly 
lowered the effect sizes, effects remained positive and large. Moreover, not a single study in 
our main meta-analysis revealed a significant reversed RT lie effect (i.e., significantly longer 
RT for truth telling compared to lying, with the 95% CI not including zero, see Table 1)8. This 
pattern of results is interesting in light of the current debate about whether lying is always 
more effortful than truth telling or whether – and if so under which circumstances – truth 
telling may be more effortful than lying (Levine, 2014; McCornack et al., 2014; Verschuere & 
Shalvi, 2014). Our findings revealed a surprising stability of the cognitive cost of deception, 
even in some of the situations that have been proposed to modulate or reverse this cost (e.g., 
practiced deception, relevant information, and motivated liars; De Paulo et al., 2003; 
McCornack et al., 2014; Walczyk et al., 2014). Evidently, laboratory research is restricted in 
the degree to which factors such as motivation or the relevance of the information being lied 
about can be manipulated. We cannot exclude the possibility that more extreme levels of 
those factors may have a stronger influence on the cost associated with deception.  
The results of our meta-analysis also contribute to the question whether the truth or 
the lie constitutes the default mode in human communication. According to the cognitive 
view on deception, the truth is typically activated first, and lying requires overcoming of the 
automatic truth response (e.g., Spence et al., 2001; Christ et al., 2009; Verschuere et al., 
2011). In contrast, researchers from social psychology and behavioral economics have pointed 
out that in tempting situations, lying may be the more automatic response, and it is truth 
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telling that may require cognitive effort and deliberation (e.g., Ariely, 2012; Bereby-Meyer & 
Shalvi, 2015; Shalvi, Eldar, & Bereby-Meyer, 2012). Indeed, given the opportunity to gain a 
monetary reward, it has been observed that people deceive more when deliberation is limited 
(e.g., by fatigue or time pressure; Kouchaki & Smith, 2014; Shalvi et al., 2012). Crucially, the 
cognitive studies and the social psychology/behavioral economics studies differ in at least two 
important aspects. First, whereas the cognitive studies examine the cognitive effort associated 
with truthful and deceptive communication, the social psychology and behavioral economics 
studies look whether and under which circumstances people deceive. This difference could be 
related to Walczyk’s (2014) ADCAT, and one may argue that they investigate different stages 
of the deception process: The decision to deceive versus the cognitive effort associated with 
the subsequent construction and action of the deceitful communication. Second, the two lines 
of research differ in the incentives used (Verschuere & Shalvi, 2014). Studies from cognitive 
psychology often use motivational instructions but often do not financially reward successful 
deception. In contrast, most studies from social psychology and behavioral economics create 
tempting situations, in which the decision to deceive is financially rewarded. Keeping this 
difference in mind, combining findings from both types of research could indicate that 
motivation influences the deception process differently at the different stages. The presence of 
a high motivation to deceive, for instance in situations in which lying is easy and financially 
beneficial, may especially facilitate the decision to lie (Shalvi et al., 2012; Kouchaki & Smith, 
2014). Once the decision to lie or tell the truth is made, however, the results of our meta-
analysis suggest that a higher motivation to lie does not eliminate the cognitive effort that 
comes with the construction of the lie and the deceptive action. Combining the two 
perspectives and more systematically investigating all deception stages could be a fruitful 
avenue for future research. For instance, more studies in which participants can freely choose 
whether to lie or tell the truth should be conducted (Panasiti et al., 2014; Pfister et al., 2014; 
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Wu et al., 2009), and the impact of this decision process on the RT cost of deception should 
be studied (Walczyk, Roper, Seemann, Humphrey, 2003). Another interesting question is 
whether there is a relatively lower cognitive cost of deceptive compared to truthful responding 
for people with a higher propensity to cheat in tempting situations (Abe & Greene, 2014; 
Greene & Paxton, 2009; Hu, Pornpattananangkul, & Nusslock, 2015; Tabatabaein, Dale, & 
Duran, 2015). 
What underlies the enhanced cognitive cost of deception? 
The finding that lying on average takes longer than truth telling supports the idea that 
lying has a cognitive cost. Three executive functions have been proposed to underlie this 
cognitive cost: Working memory, response inhibition, and task switching. Each of these 
executive functions may contribute to the RT deception effect. In support of the working 
memory hypothesis, it has been shown that during lying, the truth needs to be activated first, 
elevating RTs for lying (Debey, De Houwer, & Verschuere, 2014). Research has also shown 
that the concurrent activation of the truth and the lie response results in a conflict between the 
two responses (e.g., Dong, Hu, Lu, & Wu, 2010; Johnson, Henkell, Simon, & Zhu, 2008; 
Vidal, Hasbroucq, Grapperon, & Bonnet, 2000). Tracking participants’ arm movements while 
moving a Nintendo Wii Remote to truthful or deceptive response options, Duran et al. (2010) 
observed longer RTs for lying compared to truth telling, due to a stronger initial deviation of 
the trajectories towards the truthful response. Although the conflict inducing nature of 
deception has been supported, research is inconclusive on whether active response inhibition 
is required to overcome the prepotent truth response (Debey, Ridderinkhof, De Houwer, De 
Schryver, & Verschuere, 2015; Duran, Dale, & McNamara, 2010; Hadar, Makris, & Yarrow, 
2012; Suchotzki, Crombez, Debey, Van Oorsouw, & Verschuere, 2015; Vartanian, Kwantes, 
& Mandel, 2012). Finally, switching between truth telling and lying, like switching between 
different tasks (Kiesel et al., 2010; Monsell, 2003; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & 
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Verbruggen, 2010) could elevate RTs - though it has been shown that the RT difference 
between lying and truth telling is not merely a switch cost (Debey, Liefooghe, De Houwer, & 
Verschuere, 2014).  
It will be important to disentangle the role of these three executive functions during 
deception. Correlating independent measures of working memory, response inhibition, and 
task switching with RT deception effects could reveal information about their relative 
contributions (Visu-Petra, Miclea, & Visu-Petra, 2012). Selectively interfering with each of 
these functions (e.g., with parallel working memory tasks or by depleting inhibition resources) 
may increase RT deception effects and provide more direct support for the causal role of the 
respective functions in deception (Ambach, Stark, Peper, & Vaitl, 2008b; Ambach, Stark, & 
Vaitl, 2011; Debey et al., 2012; Verschuere et al., 2012; Visu-Petra, Varga, Miclea, & Visu-
Petra, 2013). Also, future research should develop and test predictions that are specific for 
each of the executive functions. For instance, successful inhibition of the truth response 
should lead to a leveling-off of the increase of the RT deception effect with longer RTs (i.e., 
the delta plot method; Debey, Ridderinkhof, et al., 2015; Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, 
Wijnen, & Burle, 2004).  
Is it purely cognitive?  
Our results are in line with a cognitive view of deception. Nevertheless, the RT 
difference between lying and truth telling is not necessarily purely driven by cognitive 
mechanisms. Even when matching the valence and arousal of stimuli in the truth and lie 
conditions as closely as possible, like many studies in the current meta-analysis did, deception 
may be intrinsically more emotional and arousing than truth telling. Indeed, in a series of 
experiments using the DoD paradigm, Furedy et al. found stable differences in autonomic 
arousal between lying and truth telling towards well matched neutral questions (Furedy et al., 
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1988; Furedy, Gigliotti, & Ben-Shakhar, 1994; Furedy, Posner, & Vincent, 1991), and these 
differences seemed to be unaffected by cognitive load (Vincent & Furedy, 1992). In the so-
called emotional Stroop task, emotional words have been found to prolong RTs for color 
naming responses compared to neutral words (Algom, Chajut, & Lev, 2004). 
Correspondingly, stronger emotional arousal for deception compared to truth telling may also 
contribute to RT deception effects. It is therefore important to examine the role of emotion 
and its possible interaction with cognition in deception more closely (Dolcos, Iordan, & 
Dolcos, 2011; Pessoa, 2008). Such research may, for instance, compare lying about neutral 
and emotional stimuli in order to explore effects of stimulus valence on the RT for truth 
telling and lying (Lee, Lee, Raine, & Chan, 2010; Proverbio, Vanutelli, & Adorni, 2013). 
Another possibility would be to manipulate the extrinsic emotional valence of lying and truth 
telling, for instance by associating one behavior with positive consequences (e.g., financial 
reward) and the other one with punishment (e.g., aversive noises or shocks, see e.g. Tomash 
& Reed, 2015). One may also try to assess the intrinsic emotional valence of lying with 
measures that are sensitive to valence and arousal, such as the startle eye blink (Verschuere, 
Crombez, Koster, Van Bockstaele, & De Clercq, 2007) or affective priming measures (Aarts, 
De Houwer, & Pourtois, 2012; Fazio, 2001).  
Practical implications 
Can RTs be used for lie detection? The large overall average effect indicates that RTs 
may have potential in applied settings. However, the DoD and the SLT have been nearly 
exclusively used for basic deception research. Their use in applied settings has been 
questioned (Furedy et al., 1988), because participants cannot be expected to comply with the 
truth telling and lying instruction in such contexts. Thus, DoD and the SLT require 
modification in order to be used in the applied context. A first attempt to introduce the SLT in 
a forensic context was made by Spence, Kaylor-Hughes, Brook, Lankappa, and Wilkinson 
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(2008) who used “denying” versus “admitting” instructions rather than lying versus truth 
telling. Thus, the examinee was asked in one block to admit to the allegations and in another 
block to deny the allegations. Spence at al. expected the condition that represented the lie to 
result in longer RTs and more neuronal activation in brain regions associated with lying. In 
this single case study, both the RT and the neural deception effect pointed in the same 
direction (towards the innocence of the suspect), yet this result could not be verified because 
ground truth was not available. Unfortunately, further research on the diagnostic value of the 
modified SLT is not yet available. 
The CIT and the aIAT could more readily be used in applied settings. The RT CIT can 
be applied to detect recognition of concealed (e.g., crime) information. The aIAT can be 
applied to find out which of two contrasting events (e.g., a crime versus an alibi) is true. It 
should be mentioned here that the present meta-analysis focused exclusively on within-subject 
comparisons. This choice was a deliberate one, because we think that a within-subject 
comparison of lie and truth is very useful for RT-based lie detection given the great inter-
individual variability in RTs. There are many cases in which such within-subject results can 
provide valuable information in applied situations (e.g., contrasting a crime and an alibi story 
to evaluate which story a suspect is lying about). Still, the diagnostic efficiency of a RT-based 
lie detection test will require a comprehensive estimation of both its sensitivity and its 
specificity.  
A comparison of sensitivity and specificity for the RT CIT and the CIT using skin 
conductance, event-related potentials, and fMRI is available in a recent review of Meijer et al. 
(2016). In this review, the area (a) under the receiver operating curve (ROC) was used as 
measure of diagnostic accuracy. The advantage of this index is its independence of specific 
cut-off points, which may differ across studies (see also the recommendation of the National 
Research Council, 2003). Instead, a depicts the classification accuracy across all possible cut-
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off points, with values ranging from .50 (chance classification) to 1 (perfect classification). 
The review of Meijer et al. found a weighted average of a = .82 for the RT CIT (n = 981), of a 
= .85 for the skin conductance CIT (n = 3863), of a = .88 for the event related potential CIT 
(n = 646), and of a = .94 for the fMRI-based CIT (n = 134). Except for the skin conductance 
CIT, estimates were based on a relatively small number of participants. Also, all included 
studies were conducted in the laboratory, leading to a restricted external validity. More 
research should aim to increase the external validity and the precision of the estimates in order 
to determine whether any differences reflect genuine differences between measures. 
Given that RTs are in principle under voluntary control, it is important to test their 
vulnerability to faking attempts. To this end, we conducted an additional meta-analysis 
summarizing research on the impact of countermeasures on the RT deception effect. The 
average effect size of the RT deception effect in countermeasures studies was small and non-
significant, indicating that RT deception measures are highly vulnerable to countermeasures. 
An important qualification is that 9 of the 17 studies used the aIAT which produces smaller 
effects and in which it may be easier to fake an innocent outcome than in the other RT 
paradigms (Agosta et al., 2011; Hu et al., 2012; Verschuere et al., 2009). Interestingly, the 
main meta-analysis showed that although motivation reduces the RT deception effect, it is not 
sufficient to wash out/mask the effect: The RT deception effect remained large even when 
participants were motivated to lie as convincingly as possible. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that motivation is not enough to fake a truthful test outcome. Successful faking seems 
to require knowledge about the test principles and/or specific instructions on how to 
manipulate responses. Two important avenues for future research are the development of 
algorithms that may enable the detection of countermeasure use (Agosta et al., 2011, 
Cvencek, Greenwald, Brown, Gray, & Snowden, 2010, Rosenfeld et al., 2008) and the 
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identification of design characteristics that may hamper countermeasure use (Rosenfeld et al., 
2008; Verschuere & Meijer, 2014). 
A disappointing finding with regard to the application of RT-based measures of 
deception was that there were only four studies in clinical or forensic populations. Of those, 
two studies were conducted with a clinical sample (patients with essential tremor and patients 
with Parkinson’s disease; Mameli et al., 2013), and two studies were conducted with forensic-
clinical samples. The RT deception effect and the neural mechanisms during deception were 
studied in a sample of youth offenders with an additional diagnosis of antisocial personality 
disorder (Jiang et al., 2013), and in a sample of participants with schizophrenia, of which two 
thirds had previous contact with the police (Kaylor-Hughes et al., 2011). Based on the idea 
that successful lying crucially relies on executive functions (Christ et al., 2009), which can be 
impaired in clinical and forensic populations (Miyake et al., 2000), one may expect larger 
deception RT effects in clinical and forensic samples. Knowledge on how effect sizes vary in 
different populations is crucial for an application of RT tests and this type of research requires 
a major effort in the future. 
Limitations 
The first limitation concerns our moderator analyses. In meta-analyses, levels of 
moderators are not randomly assigned to studies and consequently moderator effects may be 
confounded with other variables. The results revealed that in our moderator analyses, the 
significant moderator motivation was correlated with paradigm and stimulus proportion. More 
primary research manipulating these variables within controlled experimental designs is 
needed before strong conclusions can be drawn about how these variables may have 
influenced the motivation effect and each other. 
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A second limitation concerns the operationalization of deception in the current meta-
analysis as well as in the deception field in general. According to many definitions of lying 
(e.g., Burgoon & Buller, 1994; Krauss, 1981; Vrij, 2008; Zuckerman et al., 1981) deception 
involves making someone else believe, without forewarning, what the deceiver considers to 
be untrue. Yet, in many deception studies, participants are instructed by the experimenter 
when to lie and when to tell the truth. Also, in many studies, participants aim to deceive a 
computer, lacking the social component that many definitions stress. More generally, there is 
a need to more closely investigate the differences between deception in a laboratory and in 
real-life (Sip, Roepstorff, McGregor, & Frith, 2008).  
A third limitation is that we could not test a factor that was proposed to be crucial in 
RT deception measures: Response conflict. Whether or not a paradigm manipulates the 
conflict between the truthful response evoked by the stimulus and the required deceptive 
response during lie trials has been proposed to explain inconsistent results with different RT 
deception paradigms (Suchotzki et al., 2012; Verschuere & De Houwer, 2011). We 
considered coding response conflict as a possible moderating factor, but realized that by 
including only studies in which truth telling and lying is manipulated within subjects and in 
which RTs are measured, our sample nearly exclusively consisted of studies in which 
response competition was inherent to the task. For instance, all but one CIT studies included 
in our sample used (variations of) the 3-stimulus protocol. Here, response competition occurs 
between truthfully denying knowledge of irrelevant items and truthfully acknowledging 
recognition of target items, and deceptively denying knowledge of the critical items. All aIAT 
studies included in our sample rely on the response competition occurring when 
autobiographically true statements have to be combined with generally false statements (and 
vice versa). All SLT and DoD studies included in our meta-analysis relied on the competition 
between the truthful response and the required deceptive response during lie trials. It seems 
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worth pointing out that we did not deliberately exclude studies without response conflict, but 
that this selection is partly a natural consequence of concentrating on paradigms that 
manipulate and measure deception directly, as such tasks always involve the conflict between 
truth telling and lying. 
A fourth limitation concerns the conclusions that can be drawn from the non-
significant results of our moderator analysis. As noted earlier, absence of evidence for an 
effect cannot be taken as evidence for no effect. The large confidence intervals indicated that 
more research is needed in order to know whether some moderator effects will reach 
significance with increased power. Also, the average sample size in the studies included in 
this meta-analysis was modest (n = 29). Larger sample sizes may further increase the 
precision of effect estimates. Online research seems an efficient and promising way to 
conduct well-powered RT studies on deception (Kleinberg & Verschuere, 2015). 
Conclusions 
The current meta-analysis revealed a large and significant overall RT deception effect 
in computerized deception paradigms, even after controlling for publication bias. RT thus 
appears to be an effective measure for the study of deception. The RT paradigms included in 
our meta-analysis provide strict experimental control for the crucial lie-truth contrast. The 
obtained RT deception effect fits with the contemporary and empirically supported idea that 
lying is cognitively more demanding than truth telling. Whether or not RT-based lie detection 
is applicable in forensic settings remains to be determined in empirical research, carefully 
mapping its boundary conditions, external validity, and exploring solutions regarding its 
vulnerability to countermeasures. We hope that deception researchers will pick up the 
challenge. After all, it is only the scientific enterprise that can improve the status quo and 
differentiate valid from invalid lie detection methods.  
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Footnotes 
1The studies by Langleben and colleagues (Davatzikos et al., 2005; Langleben et al., 
2005) provide an exception in revealing that some brain areas were more active during truth 
telling than during lying. However, as will be explained later on in the manuscript, an 
interpretation of the results reported in these studies is problematic because they relied on a 
paradigm that confounded the crucial comparison of lying vs. truth telling with the ratio of 
yes vs. no responses. Yes responses were infrequent (1:10), and only used for truth trials, 
whereas No responses were frequent (9:10) and used for lie and filler trials. 
2Cohen’s d for independent samples was used in those studies 
3 We also investigated whether there would be a difference between published versus 
unpublished studies. If a publication bias is present, one may expect unpublished studies to 
produce smaller effects than published studies. Results revealed no significant difference, 
Q(1) = 1.961, p = .161, yet this result should be treated with caution due to the very small 
sample of unpublished studies. 
4It is important to note here that unlike the RT-Concealed Information Test (CIT; see 
method section), which mostly involves deception because participants have to deny 
knowledge of to-be-concealed items, deception is not always required in the ANS-based CIT. 
Although a comparison of these methods is still interesting as they belong to the same 
research field and serve the same purpose, this restricts the predictions we can draw from 
results with the ANS-based CIT for the RT CIT and deception in general. 
5Initially, we planned to code studies in which no such instructions were reported as 
“No”. Because too many studies did not report any instructions, we decided to contact the 
authors in all those cases. With a very high response rate, we obtained the information for all 
but three of the studies (see also result section). 
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6We originally planned to analyze the influence of stimulus category, as this was a 
significant moderator in two meta-analyses on the autonomic CIT effect (Ben-Shakhar & 
Elaad, 2003; Meijer et al., 2014). With stimuli coded as real crime (k = 0), mock crime (k = 
17), autobiographical (k = 50), or other (k = 47), there was no significant difference between 
categories, Q(2) = 0.219, p = .896. We noticed, however, that an interpretation of this finding 
is difficult because of the large number of studies in the “other” category. Unfortunately, due 
to the large variety of paradigms and stimuli used, it proved difficult to design a narrower, yet 
mutually exclusive sub-division of this “other” category. We therefore decided to exclude this 
analysis from the current report. Excluding the “other” category and only comparing the mock 
crime and autobiographical category also failed to reveal a significant difference Q(1) = 
0.214, p = .643. We also coded whether responses had to be given with one or two hands 
(One vs. Two). This information was only available for 33 studies and results revealed no 
significant differences between both types of responses, Q(1) = 0.444, p = .505. 
7It would have been preferable to directly run a meta-analysis on the reduction of the 
RT deception effect through countermeasures in all studies that directly contrasted these two 
conditions (average d in control conditions minus average d in countermeasures conditions). 
This was unfortunately not possible because of too much variation in the way such control 
conditions were realized in the respective studies (from studies with no control conditions to 
studies using within- or between-subject designs). To investigate whether this drastic 
reduction in effect size may be explained by characteristics of the particular studies in which 
countermeasures were studied (e.g., the specific paradigms that were used), we also calculated 
the average effect size of all available direct control conditions in the countermeasure studies. 
While numerically smaller, the average effect size, d = 0.818, 95% CI [0.586; 1.050] of this 
meta-analysis (k = 11, n = 206) was large and did not differ from the full sample, d = 1.049; 
95% CI [0.930; 1.169]. 
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8Here we do not refer to studies in which countermeasure were employed. 
Countermeasures are strategies employed by subjects to strategically alter lie test outcomes, 
and thereby mask the cognitive dynamics of lying. Note that employing countermeasures is 
not equivalent with practiced deceptive responses, with the latter being included in our main 
meta-analysis.    
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Table 1 
Summary of the studies included in the meta-analysis and the average effect size across 
studies. 
    95 % CI 
Study Paradigm n d LL UL 
Abe et al. (2008) DoD 20 0.870 0.355 1.385 
Agosta et al. (2011) - Experiment 1 aIAT 14 1.400 0.663 2.137 
Agosta et al. (2011) - Experiment 2 aIAT 10 0.394 -0.250 1.037 
Agosta et al. (2011) - Experiment 3 aIAT 18 1.282 0.659 1.906 
Agosta et al. (2011) - Experiment 4 aIAT 12 0.207 -0.365 0.779 
Allen, Iacono, & Danielson (1992) CIT 20 2.012 1.250 2.774 
Carrión, Keenan, & Sebanz (2010) SLT 11 0.675 0.020 1.329 
Cutmore et al. (2009) CIT 17 0.771 0.199 1.343 
Debey. Verschuere. & Crombez (2012) - 
Experiment 1 Depletion SLT 33 1.016 0.596 1.436 
Debey. Verschuere. & Crombez (2012) - 
Experiment 1 Control SLT 34 1.036 0.619 1.452 
Debey, Verschuere, & Crombez (2012) - 
Experiment 2 Depletion SLT 23 1.375 0.804 1.946 
Debey, Verschuere, & Crombez (2012) - 
Experiment 2 Control SLT 22 1.014 0.499 1.528 
Debey, De Houwer, & Verschuere (2014) - 
Experiment 1 SLT 26 1.558 0.985 2.131 
Debey, De Houwer, & Verschuere (2014) - 
Experiment 2 - 25% TD Group SLT 24 1.873 1.209 2.537 
Debey, De Houwer, & Verschuere (2014) - 
Experiment 2 - 75% TD Group SLT 25 2.537 1.732 3.342 
Debey et al. (2015) - Experiment 1 SLT 34 1.263 0.812 1.713 
Debey et al. (2015) - Experiment 2 SLT 51 1.967 1.497 2.437 
Debey PhD Chapter 1 - Elderly SLT 51 1.766 1.388 2.143 
Debey PhD Chapter 1 - Middle adulthood SLT 205 1.748 1.370 2.126 
Debey PhD Chapter 1 - Older adulthood SLT 129 1.823 1.366 2.280 
Debey PhD Chapter 1 - Young adulthood SLT 79 0.758 0.484 1.031 
Debey PhD Chapter 3 - Experiment 1 SLT 54 2.197 1.704 2.689 
Duran, Dale, & McNamara (2010) DoD 25 1.796 1.163 2.430 
Farrow et al. (2010) SLT 40 1.085 0.695 1.476 
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Farrow, et al. (2003) SLT 61 0.574 0.303 0.845 
Fecteau et al. (2012) SLT 11 1.607 0.713 2.502 
Fullam, McKie, & Dolan (2009) SLT 24 0.499 0.074 0.923 
Gamer & Berti (2010) - Experiment 1 CIT 12 2.597 1.414 3.781 
Gamer & Berti (2010) - Experiment 2 CIT 12 0.366 -0.219 0.950 
Gamer & Berti (2012) CIT 20 1.478 0.819 2.137 
Gamer et al. (2007) CIT 14 1.342 0.620 2.064 
Ganis & Schendan (2013) CIT 17 1.609 0.882 2.336 
Ganis, Morris, & Kosslyn (2009) DoD 14 1.020 0.373 1.666 
Ganis et al. (2011) CIT 12 0.917 0.242 1.591 
Hu, Wu, & Fu (2011) SLT 22 2.697 1.797 3.596 
Hu, Chen, & Fu (2012) - Control group SLT 16 1.912 1.088 2.736 
Hu, Chen, & Fu (2012) - Instruction group SLT 16 2.164 1.268 3.060 
Hu, Chen, & Fu (2012) - Training group SLT 16 1.194 0.553 1.836 
Hu et al. (2013) CIT 31 1.088 0.644 1.532 
Ito et al. (2011) DoD 32 1.584 1.064 2.105 
Ito et al. (2012) DoD 16 1.605 0.864 2.346 
Jiang et al. (2013) SLT 32 0.967 0.547 1.387 
Johnson, Barnhardt, & Zhu (2003) DoD 21 1.116 0.571 1.661 
Johnson et al. (2008) SLT 16 1.011 0.409 1.614 
Kaylor-Hughes et al. (2011) SLT 52 0.310 0.032 0.589 
Kleinberg & Verschuere (2015) - Experiment 1 CIT 88 1.174 0.892 1.455 
Kleinberg & Verschuere (2015) - Experiment 2 CIT 100 1.145 0.882 1.408 
Kubo & Nittono (2009) CIT 18 0.319 -0.154 0.793 
Leue, Lange, & Beauducel (2012) CIT 102 0.335 0.136 0.534 
Lui & Rosenfeld (2009) - Experiment 1 DoD 14 -0.048 -0.572 0.476 
Lui & Rosenfeld (2009) - Replication study DoD 14 0.815 0.210 1.419 
Lui & Rosenfeld (2009) - Experiment 2 DoD 13 -0.089 -0.634 0.455 
Mameli et al. (2013) - Patients with ET SLT 15 1.029 0.404 1.655 
Mameli et al. (2013) - Patients with PD SLT 20 1.595 0.934 2.255 
Mameli et al. (2013) - Healthy controls SLT 17 1.569 0.859 2.279 
Marchewka et al. (2012) DoD 29 1.891 1.282 2.500 
Matsuda et al. (2009) CIT 21 -0.017 -0.445 0.411 
Matsuda, Nittono, & Allen (2013) CIT 19 0.238 -0.218 0.694 
Meijer et al. (2007) CIT 24 1.905 1.233 2.576 
Mertens & Allen (2008) CIT 15 0.926 0.321 1.531 
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Noordraven & Verschuere (2013) Guilty group CIT 21 1.646 0.987 2.305 
Noordraven & Verschuere (2013) Innocent group 
(aCIT) CIT 21 2.033 1.284 2.782 
Nose, Murai, & Taira (2009) CIT 19 0.318 -0.143 0.779 
Pfister, Foerster, & Kunde (2014) - Experiment 1 SLT 16 0.430 -0.082 0.942 
Pfister, Foerster, & Kunde (2014) - Experiment 2 SLT 16 0.416 -0.095 0.926 
Priori et al. (2008) SLT 15 1.472 0.742 2.203 
Rosenfeld, Hu, & Pederson (2012) CIT 10 1.275 0.440 2.109 
Sai et al. (2014) CIT 16 3.616 2.271 4.962 
Sartori et al. (2008) - Experiment 1 aIAT 37 1.004 0.609 1.399 
Sartori et al. (2008) - Experiment 4 aIAT 20 1.416 0.796 2.036 
Sheridan & Flowers (2010) - Experiment 1 DoD 13 2.157 1.166 3.149 
Sheridan & Flowers (2010) - Experiment 2 DoD 12 1.779 0.870 2.689 
Sheridan & Flowers (2010) - Experiment 3 DoD 12 3.419 1.939 4.900 
Spence et al. (2001) - Experiment 1 SLT 30 0.630 0.238 1.022 
Spence et al. (2001) - Experiment 2 SLT 10 0.727 0.029 1.426 
Suchotzki et al. (2013) - Experiment 1 SLT 25 1.507 0.934 2.080 
Suchotzki et al. (2013) - Experiment 2 SLT 21 0.644 0.174 1.114 
Suchotzki et al. (2015a) SLT 88 0.975 0.721 1.229 
Suchotzki et al. (2015b) SLT 20 1.917 1.179 2.656 
Suchotzki et al. (2015c) CIT 32 1.034 0.605 1.464 
Van Bockstaele et al. (2012) - Frequent lie group SLT 14 0.520 -0.038 1.078 
Van Bockstaele et al. (2012) - Control group SLT 14 1.154 0.478 1.830 
Van Bockstaele et al. (2012) - Frequent truth 
group SLT 14 1.414 0.673 2.155 
Varga et al. (2015) CIT 46 2.090 1.569 2.612 
Vartanian, Kwantes, & Mandel (2012) DoD 15 3.006 1.817 4.195 
Vartanian et al. (2013) DoD 15 1.915 1.063 2.767 
Vendemia, Buzan, & Green (2005) SLT 25 1.682 1.073 2.291 
Vendemia, Buzan, & Simon-Dack (2005) - 
Experiment 3 SLT 38 1.408 0.959 1.856 
Verschuere et al. (2009) CIT 16 1.129 0.502 1.756 
Verschuere, Prati, & De Houwer (2009) - 
Experiment 1 aIAT 18 0.469 -0.017 0.956 
Verschuere, Prati, & De Houwer (2009) - 
Experiment 2 aIAT 18 1.026 0.455 1.597 
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Verschuere, Prati, & De Houwer (2009) - 
Experiment 3 aIAT 42 0.494 0.173 0.814 
Verschuere et al. (2010) CIT 32 1.968 1.374 2.562 
Verschuere et al. (2011) - Frequent truth group SLT 21 2.580 1.690 3.470 
Verschuere et al. (2011) - Frequent lie group SLT 22 0.356 -0.075 0.787 
Verschuere et al. (2011) - Control group SLT 21 0.778 0.290 1.266 
Verschuere, Schuhmann, & Sack (2012) SLT 26 1.278 0.760 1.797 
Verschuere, Kleinberg, & Theocharidou (2015) - 
Experiment 1 Multiple Probe CIT 19 2.190 1.292 3.089 
Verschuere, Kleinberg, & Theocharidou (2015) - 
Experiment 1 Single Probe CIT 21 1.630 0.839 2.420 
Verschuere, Kleinberg, & Theocharidou (2015) - 
Experiment 2 Multiple Probe CIT 44 1.701 1.239 2.163 
Verschuere, Kleinberg, & Theocharidou (2015) - 
Experiment 2 Single Probe CIT 53 0.575 0.284 0.865 
Visu-Petra, Miclea, & Visu-Petra (2012) CIT 21 1.263 0.690 1.837 
Visu-Petra et al. (2013) CIT 73 1.988 1.593 2.384 
Visu-Petra et al. (2014) CIT 47 2.207 1.677 2.737 
Williams - PhD Experiment 6 SLT 18 1.682 0.948 2.417 
Williams - PhD Experiment 7 SLT 19 0.857 0.306 1.408 
Williams - PhD Experiment 8 SLT 21 1.345 0.751 1.940 
Williams et al. (2013) - Experiment 1 SLT 19 0.644 0.150 1.139 
Williams et al. (2013) - Experiment 2 SLT 22 1.962 1.247 2.676 
Williams et al. (2013) - Experiment 3 SLT 36 1.971 1.410 2.531 
Williams et al. (2013) - Experiment 4 SLT 32 1.913 1.330 2.495 
Williams et al. (2013) - Experiment 5 SLT 30 2.202 1.540 2.865 
Wu, Hu, & Fu (2009) DoD 12 0.579 -0.034 1.192 
Zhao, Zheng, & Zhao (2012) CIT 16 1.785 0.996 2.575 
Average effect size (random effects model)  3307 1.256 1.137 1.374 
Corrected average effect size   1.049 0.930 1.169 
Note. n = number of participants; d = standardized paired difference; 95 % CI = 95 % Confidence 
Interval; LL = Lower Limit; UL = Upper Limit. Note also that effect sizes used in our meta-analysis 
may differ from effect sizes reported in the respective articles, as we used the dependent Cohen’s d 
and, if necessary, imputed the mean correlation (Pearson’s r) derived from studies for which 
correlations were available.  
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Table 2 
Results of the categorical moderator analyses. 
Note. k = number of independent studies; n = number of participants; d = standardized paired 
difference; 95 % CI = 95 % Confidence Interval, with 95 % CIs that do not include zero also 
indicating that the respective effect is significant with p < .05; Q = Cochran’s Q indicating for each of 
the categorical moderator variables whether the variable explains a significant portion of the variance 
of the deception effect sizes, and for each level of the variable whether there is unexplained systematic 
variance left; I2 = percentage of observed remaining variance that is due to real differences between 
studies and as such may be explained by additional moderating variables; # = results reported for this 
Moderator k n d + 95 % CI Q I2 
RT prim/sec measure* 114 3307  Q(1) = 5.271, p = .022  
primary measure 73 2442 1.354 [1.223; 1.486] Q(72) = 369.345, p < .001 81 
secondary measure 41 865 1.064 [0.854; 1.274] Q(40) = 238.808, p < .001 83 
Speed instructions 111 3220  Q(1) = 3.048, p = .081  
No 11 354 0.971 [0.642; 1.300] Q(10) = 58.535, p < .001 83 
Yes 100 2866 1.285 [1.160; 1.410] Q(99) = 561.935, p < .001 82 
Paradigm* 114 3307  Q(3) = 9.059, p = .029  
CIT 34 1063 1.297 [1.060; 1.535] Q(33) = 253.484, p < .001 87 
aIAT 9 189 0.822 [0.538; 1.106] Q(8) = 21.043, p = .007 62 
SLT 55 1778 1.287 [1.129; 1.446] Q(54) = 312.853, p < .001 83 
DoD 16 277 1.350 [0.945; 1.755] Q(15) = 86.740, p < .001 83 
Inter trial interval 93 2893  Q(2) = 2.563, p = .278  
< 4000 ms 56 2038 1.310 [1.133; 1.488] Q(55) = 443.593, p < .001 88 
4000-8000 ms 21 563 1.106 [0.884; 1.329] Q(20) = 86.169, p < .001 77 
> 8000 ms 16 292 1.384 [1.017; 1.751] Q(15) = 72.223, p < .001 79 
Proportion lie/truth trials*# 106 3175  Q(1) = 4.367, p = .037  
More lie trials 2 36 - - - 
Equal proportion 47 1653 1.441 [1.271; 1.612] Q(46) = 260.054, p < .001 82 
More truth trials 59 1522 1.184 [1.014; 1.355] Q(58) = 358.044, p < .001 84 
Stimulus relevance 114 3307  Q(1) = 2.560, p = .110  
Low 71 2617 1.210 [1.060; 1.361] Q(70) = 458.994, p < .001 85 
High 43 690 1.424 [1.209; 1.639] Q(42) = 271.889, p < .001 85 
Motivation* 114 3307  Q(2) = 6.439, p = .040  
None 85 2552 1.331 [1.189; 1.474] Q(84) = 541.480, p < .001 84 
Motivating instructions 23 626 1.002 [0.781; 1.223] Q(22) = 103.804, p < .001 79 
Incentive 6 129 1.132 [0.836; 1.427] Q(5) = 8.131, p = .149 39 
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factor are after the exclusion of the 2 studies using more lie trials; ms = milliseconds; * = significant 
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Table 3 
Distribution (absolute numbers) and dependencies (Cramer’s V) of moderator variables  
Note. Instructions = Motivating instructions; * = p < .05. ** = p < .01. *** = p < .001.  
Variable 
Paradigm  Motivation  Inter trial interval 
CIT aIAT SLT DoD V  None Instructions Incentive V  < 4000 ms 4000-8000 ms > 8000 ms V 
Publication status 
Unpublished 0 0 8 0 
.29* 
 8 0 0 
.16 
 5 0 0 
.19 
Published 34 9 47 16  77 23 6  51 21 16 
RTs prim/sec measure 
No 20 0 8 13 
.58*** 
 27 8 6 
.32** 
 17 9 10 
.25 
Yes 14 9 47 3  58 15 0  39 12 6 
Speed instructions  
No 2 0 7 2 
.15 
 9 2 0 
.09 
 5 5 1 
.24 
Yes 32 9 45 14  73 21 6  51 13 15 
Proportion lie/truth trials 
Equal proportion 0 0 37 10 
.74*** 
 42 2 3 
.38** 
 11 16 11 
.53*** 
More truth trials 34 9 11 5  36 21 2  43 5 5 
Stimulus relevance  
Low 8 5 46 12 
.54*** 
 60 8 3 
.30** 
 21 15 15 
.45*** 
High 26 4 9 4  25 15 3  35 6 1 
Motivation 
None  22 0 49 14 
.45*** 
      41 16 14 
.21 Instructions 10 9 3 1       14 2 1 
Incentive 2 0 3 1       1 3 1 
Inter trial interval 
< 4000 ms 25 3 24 4  
.42*** 
 41 14 1 
.21 
     
4000-8000 ms 5 0 15 1   16 2 3      
> 8000 ms 4 0 3 9   14 1 1      
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Table 4 
Summary of the studies included in the countermeasure meta-analysis and the average effect size 
across studies. 
    95 % CI 
Study Paradigm n d LL UL 
Agosta et al. (2011) - Experiment 1 aIAT 14 0.514 -0.043 1.072 
Agosta et al. (2011) - Experiment 2 aIAT 20 0.479 0.016 0.941 
Agosta et al. (2011) - Experiment 3 aIAT 34 0.904 0.505 1.303 
Agosta et al. (2011) - Experiment 4 aIAT 12 -0.117 -0.685 0.451 
Ganis et al. (2011) CIT 12 -2.569 -3.743 -1.396 
Hu. Chen. & Fu (2012) - Instruction group SLT 16 1.069 0.455 1.683 
Hu. Chen. & Fu (2012) - Training group SLT 16 0.362 -0.144 0.868 
Hu. Rosenfeld. & Bodenhausen (2012) aIAT 16 -0.240 -0.737 0.257 
Hu. Rosenfeld. & Bodenhausen (2012) aIAT 16 -0.933 -1.520 -0.346 
Huntjens. Verschuere. & McNally (2012) - Simulators CIT 23 0.481 0.049 0.913 
Mertens & Allen (2008) - CM Group 1 CIT 18 0.579 0.080 1.078 
Mertens & Allen (2008) - CM Group 2 CIT 15 1.153 0.500 1.806 
Mertens & Allen (2008) - CM Group 3 CIT 15 0.504 -0.033 1.041 
Uncapher et al.. 2015 SLT 24 0.223 -0.185 0.631 
Verschuere. Prati. & De Houwer (2009) - Experiment 1 aIAT 18 -0.634 -1.140 -0.127 
Verschuere. Prati. & De Houwer (2009) - Experiment 2 aIAT 37 -0.393 -0.727 -0.058 
Verschuere. Prati. & De Houwer (2009) - Experiment 3 aIAT 42 -0.214 -0.520 0.092 
Average effect size (random effects model)  348 0.128 -0.172 0.429 
Note. n = number of participants; d = standardized paired difference; 95 % CI = 95 % Confidence 
Interval; LL = Lower Limit; UL = Upper Limit 
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Figure 1. Funnel plot of effect size (Cohen’s d) against standard error (plotted from high to low 
standard error). The unfilled circles indicate studies included in our meta-analysis and the filled 
circles indicate missing studies that were imputed using the trim and fill method. The unfilled 
diamond symbol indicates the estimated mean effect size and its 95% confidence interval 
without the imputed studies and the filled diamond symbols the estimated mean effect size and 
its 95% confidence interval with the imputed studies. 
